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ABSTRACT
Exabytes of data are created online every day. This deluge of data is no more
apparent than it is on social media. Naturally, finding ways to leverage this un-
precedented source of human information is an active area of research. Social media
platforms have become laboratories for conducting experiments about people at scales
thought unimaginable only a few years ago.
Researchers and practitioners use social media to extract actionable patterns such
as where aid should be distributed in a crisis. However, the validity of these patterns
relies on having a representative dataset. As this dissertation shows, the data collected
from social media is seldom representative of the activity of the site itself, and less so
of human activity. This means that the results of many studies are limited by the
quality of data they collect.
The finding that social media data is biased inspires the main challenge addressed
by this thesis. I introduce three sets of methodologies to correct for bias. First, I
design methods to deal with data collection bias. I offer a methodology which can
find bias within a social media dataset. This methodology works by comparing the
collected data with other sources to find bias in a stream. The dissertation also
outlines a data collection strategy which minimizes the amount of bias that will appear
in a given dataset. It introduces a crawling strategy which mitigates the amount of
bias in the resulting dataset. Second, I introduce a methodology to identify bots and
shills within a social media dataset. This directly addresses the concern that the users
of a social media site are not representative. Applying these methodologies allows the
population under study on a social media site to better match that of the real world.
Finally, the dissertation discusses perceptual biases, explains how they affect analysis,
and introduces computational approaches to mitigate them.
i
The results of the dissertation allow for the discovery and removal of different
levels of bias within a social media dataset. This has important implications for social
media mining, namely that the behavioral patterns and insights extracted from social
media will be more representative of the populations under study.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Social media is an important outlet to understanding human activity. Over the
last few years many social media sites have given users a way to express their interests,
friendships, and behavior in an online setting. Because of their ubiquity, these
platforms have been critical in many global events. During the Arab Spring protests,
these platforms helped protesters to organize. Across several natural disasters such as
Hurricane Sandy, several earthquakes, typhoons, and floods, social media has been
used both by the affected to request assistance as well as for humanitarian aid agencies
to spread information about critical aid resources. Social media is used by everyday
people to discuss current events, and their lives. There are several sites with hundreds
of millions of users, and a few sites with billions of users all sharing, posting, and
discsussing what they see around them.
Noticing the richness, extent, scale, and dynamic nature of social media data,
researchers welcome the opportunities to use social data to answer questions regarding
human behavior, information diffusion, and influence propagation on social media (Liu
et al. 2016). Though not all social media sites provide sample data even for research
purposes, some sites do provide mechanisms through which researchers can obtain a
sample of data to conduct their research. One example is Twitter, a microblogging
site where users exchange short, 140-character messages called “tweets.” Ranking as
the 8th most popular site in the world by the Alexa rank in August of 2016,1 the site
boasts 313 million monthly users publishing 500 million tweets per day. Twitter’s
1http://www.alexa.com/topsites
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platform for rapid communication is a vital platform in recent events including
Hurricane Sandy,2 the Arab Spring (Shamanth Kumar et al. 2013), and several
political campaigns (Tumasjan et al. 2010; Gayo-Avello, Metaxas, and Mustafaraj
2011). As a result, Twitter’s data has been coveted by both computer and social
scientists to better understand human behavior and dynamics. Because of its open
nature with sharing data as well as the vast richness and size of the data generated
on Twitter, many research projects use Twitter data to understand human behavior
online. This has led to Twitter being called the “fruit fly”, or model organism, for
computational social sciences research (Tufekci 2014).
Despite the wide adoption of social media, especially Twitter, for computational
social sciences research, there are many problems that stand in the way of making
accurate assessments from this data. The data that is obtained from social media
sites does not represent the activity of people in the real world (Duggan and Brenner
2013). The objective of this thesis is to provide tools and techniques to identify and
mitigate the biases that occur in social media in order to provide researchers with a
more unbiased view for their research.
1.1 Problem Statement
While social media is an amazing resource for societal research, there may exist
biases on the social media platforms. These biases are introduced during data collection.
Researchers should account for them in their study, i.e., whether a representative
dataset is obtained for planned computational social science research. If the goal
2http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/28/nyregion/hurricane-sandy.html
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The World Social Media Sampled Social Data
1	 2	
Figure 1: Overview of the Social Data Collection Process: Human Behavior Becomes
Data upon Which Research Is Conducted. Humans Generate Data on Social Platforms
(“1”) Which Is Then Collected by Researchers in Order to Answer Questions about
Their Behavior (“2”). At Both Points, Nonrepresentative Sampling Procedures Are in
Place That Will Skew the Results Taken by Researchers on Sampled Social Data.
of computational social science is to study society at scale, then the data studied
must provide an accurate reflection of society. In this work I study whether the data
that comes from Twitter, the model organism, is representative of society. More
specifically, I first study whether or not the sampled data that researchers often use
for their research is representative of the full, unsampled data on Twitter. I next study
the ways in which Twitter itself is not representative of society. I identify ways in
which the data can be biased, and introduce computational techniques for detecting
and mitigating these biases. In this work, I focus on bias that arises from sampling
strategies on social media and potential sources of data bias, and present ways of
detecting and mitigating bias in order to draw credible conclusions about society from
sampled and limited data. Both sampling mechanisms in data disclosure, as well as
the implicit sampling mechanisms for users on a social media site are focused upon in
this dissertation.
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(a) Statistics of Papers That Use Twitter.
N = 843.
(b) Statistics of Sources in Twitter Papers.
N = 391.
Figure 2: Breakdown of Papers That Use Twitter (Left), and among Them Who Use
the Different APIs as Data Sources (Right). Twitter Is a Major Source for Social
Media Research, with 46% of All Papers Using It in Their Findings. Overall, 46% X
78% = 36% of All Papers Use the Streaming API. “unclear” Refers to Papers That
Did Not Properly Disclose How They Obtained Their Tweets.
1.1.1 The Scale of the Problem
In our discussion of data collection bias, one natural question which may arise
in this work is the emphasis on Twitter’s APIs. Why are they significant? A study
performed in 2014 found that among all of the papers published at The International
Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM), a preliminary conference in the
area of social media mining, in 2013, almost half of them used Twitter to obtain some
results for their research.
In this thesis we complement their analysis by analyzing the papers from all of
the ICWSM conferences held from 2010 - 2017, inclusive. We downloaded 843 papers,
including long papers, short papers, and demos. First, we counted the number of
papers that used Twitter to obtain results. This was done by using a regular expression.
The case-insensitive regular expression “\bTwitter\b” was used. to count the number
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of papers. Empirically, we discovered that papers that mention Twitter at least 5
times tend to use it in their analysis. Applying this rule to all of the papers from
ICWSM, we find that 46% of all papers use Twitter in some capacity for their research.
This supports the analysis performed by Tufekci 2014.
Furthermore, we broke down the Twitter-based papers based upon how they
collected their Twitter data. We used regular expressions to break the papers into
one of four categories: Firehose, Streaming/Sample APIs, REST APIs, or Unclear.
Unclear means that the paper did not specify how they got to their data well enough
for us to classify it into one of the other three categories. To do this, we employed
regular expressions. The breakdown of the papers is shown in Figure 2b. We find that
78% of these papers, or 36% of all papers at ICWSM, use the Streaming or Sample
APIs.
This analysis is provided to give an understanding of the scale of data collection
bias, a prominent theme of this dissertation. While we focus on ICWSM for this
analysis, it is not limited to this one conference. Twitter data is also used widely
in other major academic venues such as the World Wide Web (WWW) Conference,
and the Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing (CSCW)
conference. Perhaps more importantly, it is also used widely by advertising agencies
and government and private-sector analysts across the world.
Malicious user bias is another problem that deserves intense study to due the
prevalence of malicious users. Bots alone contribute to a large amount of the bias
on social platforms. Twitter, Inc. claims that bots account for 8.5% of the accounts
on the site are automated.3 Other claims are larger, with one study noting that
3https://qz.com/248063/twitter-admits-that-as-many-as-23-million-of-its-active-users-are-
actually-bots/
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Figure 3: An overview of the topics in this dissertation.
approximately 50% of the accounts created in 2014 were bots.4 In our own dataset
collected from the Firehose (Morstatter et al. 2013), we note that 34.5% of all of
the accounts from 2011 have been suspended.5 These accounts can add a significant
amount of bias to any dataset collected from social media.
1.2 Problems Addressed in this Thesis
The theme of this dissertation is addressing pitfalls that befall social data research.
Under this umbrella, we provide tools and techniques to detect, assess, and mitigate
several different types of pitfalls that can occur in social data. The pitfalls discussed
in detail in this dissertation can be seen in Figure 1. The pitfalls shown here are major
pitfalls, and cover a wide range of the research done using social media data; however,
they are not comprehensive. We leave out pitfalls, for example ethical issues related to
4https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/03/21/new-report-spotlights-twitters-retention-problem/
5Accounts are usually suspended for bot behavior, but there are other reasons that account for a
small percentage of these suspended users. These reasons include sharing copyrighted content and
hate speech.
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handling social data (Zimmer 2010), and the notion that individuals behave differently
on online platforms than they would in the real world (Wilson et al. 2009). In the
related work chapter, we will discuss other types of pitfalls, such as those introduced
in Olteanu et al. 2016. In this thesis, we focus on the following pitfalls for social data
analysis:
• Bias from Researchers. This pertains to biases from researchers’ assumptions
about the validity of their data. When collecting data from social media, one
cannot be sure if that data actually represents the true population of the site. I
address this question by comparing data obtained through Twitter’s sampled
APIs with Twitter’s full dataset. I am the first to address this problem in social
data.
Confirming that bias can exist in the way that data is distributed is an important
one, but comparing the data from the full dataset is not tractable for most
researchers due to the prohibitive cost. Thus, I develop ways for researchers and
practitioners to assess the amount of bias in their dataset, as well as to collect
data in such a way that the amount of bias is mitigated.
• Bias from Adversaries. Bias is not just a factor of bizarre blackbox sampling
strategies employed by social data APIs. There are malicious actors who seek
to inject bias into the data one receives in order to change the statistics of the
site. This is often done in political contexts to inflate the perceived popularity
of a candidate or message,6 but it’s also very effective in other domains like
advertising. It is important that those studying social media data accurately
6https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2017/06/how-the-trump-russia-data-machine-
games-google-to.html
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identify as many of these malicious actors as possible, not just so that we can
remove them, but also so that we can get a better understanding of their agendas.
The way social media data is generated provides unique vulnerabilities that can
be exploited by malicious actors. I introduce a new attack vulnerability for
social data. I also demonstrate simple strategies for identifying users who are
using this attack to increase the prevalence of their messages.
Specialized users on social media can introduce bias by skewing the perception
of popularity of an idea, candidate or product. Shills are highly specialized and
trained to combat opposing opinions. In concluding this section, we discuss how
shills can be detected based upon their online behavior and show how they differ
from other classes of malicious users.
• Perceptual Biases from Social Media Designers. Bias in social media
data does not stop at the way data is distributed, or how that distribution is
manipulated by nefarious actors. There are also many perceptual biases that can
occur in social media data. One example is that the way that data is produced
on social media may not be perceived the way that the author intended. This
can have real impact on the way that this data is perceived and thus analyzed.
I will introduce one type of bias that is unique to the way data is analyzed: that
the intended meaning behind the emojis used by the authors of social media
posts varies by the platform the author used to write the post.
By addressing these issues, the contribution of the dissertation can be summarized
as tools and techniques to identify and remove social data bias. While these biases
occur from different perspectives, and can be introduced at different steps in the
research process, they all have the side effect of introducing artifacts into the data.
These artifacts then will pollute the conclusions taken from social media data. By
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applying the techniques in this dissertation, we allow those who use social media data
as part of their research to obtain more credible and generalizable results from this
social data.
In this dissertation, I will outline the steps that I have taken to address each of
these issues. First, in Chapter 2 I will address other work that has been done to address
the problem of social data bias and how it supports and furthers our findings and
conclusions. Next, in Chapter 3 I introduce our strategy for measuring and detecting
data collection bias from social data APIs like the Twitter Streaming API. In Chapter
4 I will introduce a method for measuring the amount of bias that is present in a
dataset collected from these APIs, and present methodologies for collecting data from
these outlets in such a way that the amount of bias is minimized. Chapter 5 discusses
the vulnerabilities of APIs to malicious users, and discusses the ways to detect these
users. It then focuses on detecting bots that attempt to pollute social data platforms
and introduces the concepts of shills. Chapter 6 introduces conceptual biases that
can be present in social media data, and focuses on one type: platform-specific emoji
biases. It also introduces ways to correct for them. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the
thesis and discusses areas of future work.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
This chapter contains other works related to this dissertation. It is organized
based upon the topics presented in the subsequent chapters. We begin by presenting
a taxonomy of the different types of bias that can manifest in social data. We
then continue to present the related work for each of the subsequent chapters in the
dissertation.
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Figure 4: Overview of the Two Dimensions along Which We Characterize Bias. “Intent”
Refers to the Knowledge of the Actor about the Extent to Which They Are Biasing
the Data. “Source” Refers to Whether the Bias Originates from Within or Outside of
the System.
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2.1 Dimensions of Social Data Bias
In this section we take a broader view to social data bias. We look at other work,
not just limited to computer sciences literature, which addresses the issue of bias
pertaining to social data. The discussion will be presented with two main dimensions
of bias. The first dimension is intent, which is whether or not the data is being
intentionally manipulated. I characterize the concerns about bias as coming from
intentional skewing of the data by a body of people or a group. The second dimension
of bias is whether it is endogenous of exogenous to the data. I view exogenous bias as
that which comes from external factors and endogenous as that which occurs in the
way the data is handled. A characterization of these dimensions is shown in Figure 4.
Below, I will discuss each of the quadrants in detail as well as present research work
that helps to further characterize these dimensions. Where appropriate, I will discuss
how my work fits into the general theme of the quadrant.
2.1.1 Unintentional Exogenous Bias
This refers to the case where bias is unintentionally encoded into data by selection
processes external to the system. These unintentional biases can be learned by machine
learning algorithms, and perpetuate this same bias in their predictions. This is the
type of bias that leads to machine learning algorithms that are more likely to predict
that a black person will re-commit a crime (Angwin et al. 2016), that are less likely
to predict a black person as the winner of a beauty contest,7 or are more likely to
7https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/08/artificial-intelligence-beauty-contest-
doesnt-like-black-people
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predict Asians as “blinking” in photographs.8 As Cathy O’Neil points out in her book,
Weapons of Math Destruction, the common problems leading to these phenomenon are
incorrect data and uninterpretable measures, statistics, or algorithms (O’Neil 2016).
The problem of recidivism prediction, or predicting whether a prisoner will reoffend,
is one area that has received a lot of attention in terms of fairness. Some public
prison systems have hired private companies to algorithmically determine if a person
will re-commit. This has been shown to overpredict African Americans as likely
to reoffend at a higher rate than whites (Angwin et al. 2016). This problem was
underscored by Richard Berk (Berk 2011b), who discusses the legal and data-related
problems pertaining to treating false-positives and false negatives with even care. This
issue has inspired new algorithms to address these issues. One example is a model,
created by Berk, to account for the asymmetric needs of parole officers (Berk 2011a).
For example, Cynthia Rudin’s group (Zeng, Ustun, and Rudin 2016) employed a
“Supersparse Linear Model” which has two interesting attributes that can be used
for this problem. First, it allows the user to specify the true positive rate and false
positive rate for each class, allowing to better control the tolerance for false positives.
Secondly, the weights learned by the linear model are small, and interpretable. This
allows for decision makers such as judges to understand why the model is making
the prediction it is making. In the area of reinforcement learning, work has been
done to ensure that the actions taken by the agent are “fair” (Jabbari et al. 2016).
Their evaluation of fairness employs a definition of fairness that says that an agent
should never prefer an action if a more rewarding action is available (Joseph, Kearns,
Morgenstern, and Roth 2016). In future work, they show that this can learn at least
8http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1954643,00.html
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as fast as existing reinforcement learning processes (Joseph, Kearns, Morgenstern,
Neel, et al. 2016). This has real-world implications for things such as hiring processes.
Beyond recidivism prediction, there are a number of other areas in which bias
present in the data can be amplified by machine learning processes. One example is
word embeddings. Word embeddings offer a way to represent instances, namely words,
through “contexts.” These contexts are learned based upon the proximity of words in
a corpus. In addition to this they also often semantic properties that allow users to
quickly understand certain aspects of the dataset. One example of these properties
is analogies, where simple vector arithmetic is used to find relationships among the
words. One famous example of this property is “king” - “man” + “woman” = “queen,”
where taking the vector for king and subtracting that of man and adding the one
for woman will yield a vector that is closes to the word “queen.” It has been found
word embeddings trained on real world data reveal unsavory properties about society.
For example, Bolukbasi et al. 2016 found that “Computer Programmer” - “man” +
“woman” = “Homemaker.” They claim that this finding reflects sexist undertones in
the text upon which the word embeddings are trained. To get around this issue, the
authors proposed an approach to find dimensions of the model that are correlated
with gender, and then skew them such that words that should not be correlated with
gender are not. This is done at a slight cost in terms of predictive accuracy of the
model. This is a direct approach to debiasing the data. Similar approaches have been
taken to debias the data. One example is in a series of papers authored by Wu, where
bias is also mitigated through identifying correlated features that should not correlate
with the predictive variable (Wu and Wu 2016; Zhang, Wu, and Wu 2016), such as
race in the case of housing decisions.
As a final note, it is important to note that the traditional “machine learning”
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interpretation of the word bias also fits in here. Many machine learning algorithms are
formulated with the understanding that the data is not always centered, and account
for this by adding a bias term to the formulation (Bishop 2006). This fits in this
category because this type of bias is usually unintentional and occurs in the way the
data is generated, not usually within the model.
2.1.2 Unintentional Endogenous Bias
This refers to problems that can exist when the mechanisms through which data is
distributed cause the data to be collected in such a way that inferences drawn upon it
are skewed. We further split this group into two subcategories, those where the data
distribution mechanism is known and those where it is not.
In some cases, the way in which the data is generated is known. Despite this,
the problem of how to accurately collect samples has a long history. For example,
the method through which people are selected for polling is completely visible, but
this has consistently caused problems for pollsters. This was true in the widely
mispredicted election of Dewey and Truman (Mosteller 1949) and continues to elections
today (Allcott, Gentzkow, et al. 2017). This is the case on many social media sites,
such as those in which it is customary to create custom software to collect the data.
These were commonly used in the early days of collecting data from the web (Boldi
et al. 2004; Cho and Garcia-Molina 1999), and correspond to many web-scale datasets
that are still in use today.9 Many attempts have been constructed to combat this type
of bias (Granovetter 1976; Ye, Lang, and Wu 2010; Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt
9Two example repositories built from such crawling strategies are the ASU Social Com-
puting Data Repository (http://socialcomputing.asu.edu/), and the Stanford SNAP Repository
(https://snap.stanford.edu/data/#socnets).
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2006). In fact, it has been found that many network sampling approaches fail to yield
samples that can recover the initial parameters of the underlying distribution (Ahmed,
Neville, and Kompella 2013).
While these sampling approaches are important, a new type of sampling has arisen
in recent years. Driven both by the abundance and speed of data produced on social
media, some sites have acknowledged the use of collecting data for research and
applications. The key difference is that instead of writing a crawler that collects the
data, the data is provided by the social media site. This creates a sort of “black box”
for data distribution. This is where the majority of my work is situated. Previously,
researchers just used this outlet to collect data with the assumption that it would
be provided in a statistically representative manner. My work initially challenged
this assumption (Morstatter et al. 2013) by showing the different ways in which the
data from these outlets could be biased. In light of these findings, we also created
two approaches for correcting this type of bias (Morstatter, Pfeffer, and Liu 2014;
Sampson et al. 2015).
2.1.3 Intentional Exogenous Bias
This section refers to the set of malicious actors who work in tandem to make
their voice heard at disproportionate levels. This is not distinctive to social media.
One real-world example of this astroturfing (Cho et al. 2011), where companies or
political advocacy groups hire real people to go to a rally to lobby on their behalf.
This phenomenon is exacerbated in the online world where faces are not counted,
but online accounts. This has caused a surge in bot accounts that create fake posts
and connections in order to make certain users or topics seem more salient. Many
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approaches have been proposed to address this problem (Chu et al. 2010; Lee, Eoff,
and Caverlee 2011; Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss, Goncalves, Flammini, et al. 2011;
Thomas, Grier, and Paxson 2012; Thonnard and Dacier 2011; Xie et al. 2008).
My work is situated in how to identify bots in such a way that the most bots are
removed (Morstatter, Wu, et al. 2016).
2.1.4 Intentional Endogenous Bias
This refers to attempts by people or groups to “game the system.” Actors within
a system can work in tandem to skew its results. This is becoming increasingly
common, especially in online systems. One example is how government censors in
China selectively remove content to allow for some contrary opinions, but ultimately
stop people from gathering offline (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013, 2014). Recently,
the administrators of Reddit10 manually changed the content of some users posts to
make it appear as if they did not favor one presidential candidate.11 What these
methods have in common is that malicious actors privy to the internal working of the
system can exploit it to bias content in their favor. Examples of this phenomenon are
abundant offline. For example, gerrymandering is a common practice used to draw
district lines in such a way as to prefer an outcome for one party (Issacharoff 2002).
Recently, the technique for skewing bias has taken been discovered on social media.
In my work I identify a method through which malicious bots can time their tweets
10http://www.reddit.com
11https://www.cnet.com/news/reddit-ceo-admits-to-editing-user-comments-amid-pizzagate-
malarkey/
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so that they are 82x more likely to be selected by Twitter’s APIs (Morstatter, Dani,
et al. 2016).
Having discussed this quadrant of different social biases, we now turn our attention
to specific areas that are
2.2 Sampling Bias in Social Media Data
Twitter’s Streaming API has been used throughout the domain of social media and
network analysis to generate understanding of how users behave on these platforms. It
has been used to collect data for topic modeling (Hong and Davison 2010; Pozdnoukhov
and Kaiser 2011), network analysis (Sofean and Smith 2012), and statistical analysis
of content (Mathioudakis and Koudas 2010), among others. Researchers’ reliance
upon this data source is significant, and these examples only provide a cursory glance
at the tip of the iceberg. Due to the widespread use of Twitter’s Streaming API in
various scientific fields, it is important that we understand how using a sub-sample of
the data generated affects these results.
From a statistical point of view, the “law of large numbers” (mean of a sample
converges to the mean of the entire population) and the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem
(the unknown distribution X of an attribute in a population can be approximated
with the observed distribution x) guarantee satisfactory results from sampled data
when the randomly selected sub-sample is big enough when samples are taken i.i.d..
From a network algorithmic (Wasserman and Faust 1994) perspective, the question is
more complicated. Previous efforts have delved into the topic of network sampling
and how working with a restricted set of data can affect common network measures.
The problem was studied earlier in (Granovetter 1976), where the author proposes
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an algorithm to sample networks in a way that allows one to estimate basic network
properties. More recently, Costenbader and Valente 2003 and Borgatti, Carley, and
Krackhardt 2006 have studied the effect of data error on common network centrality
measures by randomly deleting and adding nodes and edges. The authors discover that
centrality measures are usually most resilient on dense networks. In Kossinets 2006,
the authors study global properties of simulated random graphs to better understand
data error in social networks. Leskovec and Faloutsos 2006 proposes a strategy for
sampling large graphs to preserve network measures.
We compare the datasets by analyzing facets commonly used in the literature.
We start by comparing the top hashtags found in the tweets, a feature of the text
commonly used for analysis. In Tsur and Rappoport 2012, the authors try to predict
the magnitude of the number of tweets mentioning a particular hashtag. Using a
regression model trained with features extracted from the text, the authors find that
the content of the idea behind the tag is vital to the count of the tweets employing it.
Tweeting a hashtag automatically adds a tweet to a page showing tweets published
by other tweeters containing that hashtag. In Yang et al. 2012, the authors find that
this communal property of hashtags along with the meaning of the tag itself drive the
adoption of hashtags on Twitter. De Choudhury et al. 2010 studies the propagation
patterns of URLs on sampled Twitter data.
Topic analysis can also be used to better understand the content of tweets. Kireyev,
Palen, and Anderson 2009 drills the problem down to disaster-related tweets, discov-
ering two main types of topics: informational and emotional. Finally, Yin et al. 2011;
Hong et al. 2012; Pozdnoukhov and Kaiser 2011 all study the problem of identifying
topics in geographical Twitter datasets, proposing models to extract topics relevant
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to different geographical areas in the data. Joseph, Tan, and Carley 2012 studies how
the topics users discuss drive their geolocation.
Geolocation has become a prominent area in the study of social media data.
In Wakamiya, Lee, and Sumiya 2011 the authors try to classify towns based upon the
content of the geotagged tweets that originate from within the town. De Longueville,
Smith, and Luraschi 2009 studies Twitter’s use as a sensor for disaster information by
studying the geographical properties of users tweets. The authors discover that Twit-
ter’s information is accurate in the later stages of a crisis for information dissemination
and retrieval.
2.3 Assessing the Impact of Data Collection Bias
Our related work for this portion of the dissertation falls into three areas: one
concerning work previously done on Twitter’s Streaming API, another concerning
research done to verify other black box systems on the web, and finally another area
devoted to previous evidence of bias found on Twitter’s Streaming API.
2.3.1 Work with the Streaming API
Twitter’s Streaming API has been used throughout the domain of social media and
network analysis to generate understanding of how users behave on these platforms. It
has been used to collect data for topic modeling (Hong and Davison 2010; Pozdnoukhov
and Kaiser 2011; Shamanth Kumar et al. 2012), network analysis (Sofean and Smith
2012), and statistical analysis of content (Mathioudakis and Koudas 2010), among
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others. Researchers’ reliance upon this data source is significant, and these examples
only provide a cursory glance at the tip of the iceberg.
2.3.2 Bias in Black Box Systems
The topic of assessing the results from a black box system is related to our
work. Another web sciences black box that has been studied is Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (AMT). In Crump, McDonnell, and Gureckis 2013, the authors assess the
representativeness of the users on AMT, and provide example tasks showing areas
where these users give good performance. In a similar vein, Snow et al. 2008 proposes
a method to correct for response bias in the results obtained from AMT. In the area
of social media research, this topic has also been studied from the perspective of
link propagation. In De Choudhury et al. 2010, the authors analyze the effect data
sampling has on the way link propagation is perceived. Specifically, the authors study
URLs shared on sampled Twitter data.
2.3.3 Bias in Twitter Data
There are many potential areas of bias in Twitter. One possible area of bias in
Twitter data comes from the demographic makeup of the users on the site, often
referred to as “participation bias.” In Mislove et al. 2011, the authors use last names
of users to estimate their race, and find that the ethnicity/race distribution of Twitter
users diverges widely from U.S. Census estimates. Duggan and Brenner 2013 finds
similar results, and also finds that adults aged 18-29, African Americans, and urban
residents are over-represented on the site.
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The bias we focus on in much of this dissertation is concerned with sample bias
from Twitter’s APIs. The work performed in Morstatter et al. 2013 compared four
commonly-studied facets of the Streaming API and Firehose data, looking for evidence
of bias in each facet. They obtained widely different results across facets. First,
they studied the statistical differences between the two datasets, using correlation to
understand the differences between the top n hashtags in the two datasets. They find
bias in the occurrence of the top hashtags for low values of n.
The authors compared topical facets of the text by extracting topics with LDA (Blei,
Ng, and Jordan 2003), where they found similar evidence of bias. The authors discover
that the topics extracted through LDA are significantly different than those extracted
from the gold standard Firehose data. The other facets compared in the data were
the networks extracted from the dataset. Here, the authors extracted the User × User
retweet network from both sources and compare centrality measures across the two
networks. They find that, on average, the Streaming API is able to find the most
central users in the Firehose 50% of the time. The final facet they compare is the
distribution of “geotagged” tweets. Here, they find no bias and that the number of
geotagged tweets from the Streaming API is over 90% of that in the Firehose.
2.4 Mitigating Data Collection Bias
The predictive power of social media services, such as Twitter, has been used to
effectively track and predict the spread of disease (Achrekar et al. 2011; Garcia-Herranz
et al. 2014; Gomide et al. 2011). Other efforts have shown promising results by using
social media to discover a wide range of collective knowledge such as real-time political
polling (Ceron et al. 2014; Tumasjan et al. 2010) and the potential success of movies
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at box-office (Asur and Huberman 2010; Lu, Wang, and Maciejewski 2014). However,
there are very few standards governing how data from social media is gathered and
how research and predictions should be approached (Madlberger and Almansour 2014).
A number of studies have shown that the method used for sampling can introduce
various forms of bias which introduce error into results and remain largly unnoticed
(Gonzalez-Bailon et al. 2014; Morstatter et al. 2013). Very little research has gone into
methods for correcting for bias. Morstatter et al. proposed using bootstrapping (Efron
and Tibshirani 1994) and secondary data sources to obtain a confidence interval for
the occurrence rate of a hashtag between the two sources. Such a statistical difference
could be used as a red flag for the presence of bias in the stream (Morstatter, Pfeffer,
and Liu 2014).
Several relevant works have attempted to uncover the underlying mechanisms
with which Twitter disseminates tweets through its various streaming APIs. In 2013,
Morstatter et al. tested the differences between the public Twitter streaming API,
which is commonly used by researchers but will only return up to 1% of all available
data, and the prohibitively priced “firehose” stream, which offers all of the available
data to those willing to pay for it (Morstatter et al. 2013). This work uncovered a
number of anomalies such as varying top hashtags, differing topic distributions, and
varying network measures when using the same searches on both the paid and free
services. They explain that according to the “law of large numbers” if the sample is
truely random then it should relate well with the results from the population, in this
case the “firehose” results (Morstatter et al. 2013). These differences indicate that
the streaming API introduces some form of bias when determining how to limit the
results sent to a stream (Morstatter, Pfeffer, and Liu 2014).
The possible causes of this sampling bias have been a continuing source of inquiry.
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Joseph, Landwehr, and Carley 2014 used five independent streaming sources the
differences between multiple streaming results taken at similar but varying time
windows. They used a set of keywords and usernames including stop words such as
“the” and “i” and words that they specifically invented for the experiment. In order to
determine if starting time had an impact on the results they staggered each start by a
fraction of a second. After running these tests multiple times, they showed that, when
using the same keywords across each stream, 96% of unique tweets were captured by
all streams (Joseph, Landwehr, and Carley 2014). Since the experiment used stop
words that undoubtedly make up a significant portion of English tweets, a random
distribution method would have given results that varied wildly across the separate
streaming connections. This is strong proof that the sampling method used by Twitter
is highly deterministic.
Kergl et al. found further evidence of non-random sampling. In earlier forms
of the Twitter streaming API, the three data streaming levels which provided 1%,
10%, and 100% of Twitter data were named “Spritzer”, “Gardenhose”, and “Firehose”
respectively. These streams, unlike the filter-based stream, provide data from the
entire body of current tweets. Through analysis of the unique tweet IDs provided
by Twitter, the authors discovered that the unique IDs included data, such as the
timestamp when the tweet was created, the data center that created it, and other
information related to the underlying technical infrastructure of the Twitter data
centers. Analysis of the timestamp in particular showed that, in the limited streams,
the timestamps only fell over a specific interval of milliseconds directly related to
the percentage of sample coverage specified by the service level (Kergl, Roedler, and
Seeber 2014). Though no similar timestamp-based sampling method appears to be
used in the filtered search stream, the non-random nature of the filtered data, in
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addition to the use of simple deterministic methods in past dissemination schemes,
indicates that there are underlying artifacts in the filtered stream infrastructure as
well that may be adding bias to gathered samples.
The 1% boundary has proven to be a significant hindrance for applications and
research that require as close to a complete set of data as possible. These include
mission critical response situations, such as those necessary for emergency response
and monitoring applications (S Kumar et al. 2011; Vieweg et al. 2010), as well as any
form of research that is highly affected by sample bias. As a direct result of the high
cost of the “firehose” service, many users have attempted to develop novel solutions
for gathering data to improve either the size and coverage of the dataset (Li, Wang,
and Chang 2013) or the overall quality of results for a smaller sample (Ghosh et al.
2013). Li, Wang, and Chang 2013 proposed a system that uses “automatic keyword
selection” to determine the best search terms to use for a given search through a
keyword cost-based system. Using this method improved topic coverage from 49% of
targeted tweets obtained through human-selected keywords to 90% in the automatic
system. Ghosh et al. took an alternate approach and attempted to improve the quality
of their sample by gathering topic-based twitter data from experts and comparing the
“diversity, timeliness, and trustworthiness” to a larger sample of community tweets
of the same topic. While the expert-based search did show an improvement in all of
these areas, they cautioned that crowd-based data could not be entirely discounted as
it captured other significant properties such as the flow of conversation in the topic
that is otherwise ignored by experts (Ghosh et al. 2013).
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2.5 Identifying Bots in Social Media Data
Bot detection approaches in general try to build a classifier that labels a given
user as a bot or not. In the first part of this section we introduce different detection
methods and group them based on features they extract from the data to train the
classifier. Then we discuss techniques of ground truth acquisition, their distinctions,
pros and cons from both the perspective of convenience and resulting data quality.
Finally, we enumerate evaluation mechanisms that have been used for this task.
Recent statistics show that more than 50% of Twitter accounts are not human
users. Social network administrators are well aware of these harmful activities and
try to delete these users using their suspension/removal systems. By one estimate
28% of accounts created in 2008 and half of the accounts created in 2014 have been
suspended by Twitter.12 What is not well taken care of is the role of bots in facilitating
these malicious activities. In one study, 145,000 accounts survived for months without
detection. Today, 16% of spammers in Twitter are bots (Grier et al. 2010).
Although social network spam detection approaches are still insufficient, bot
detection in social networks has received wide attention from the research community
in recent years (Cook et al. 2014; John et al. 2009; Kanich et al. 2008; Stone-Gross et al.
2011). Methods proposed to solve this problem mostly observe it as a classification
task which extracts features from the user in order to classify it as a bot or a human.
A categorization of the features used in these classifiers is as follows:
• Content of posts and messages: In using content, the goal is to find properties
that show the difference between what is published by a bot and what is published
by a normal user. The text sent by each bot is significantly different from another
12http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/03/21/new-report-spotlights-twitters-retention-problem/
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bot but they all tend to use URLs to link to the content they promote (Xie
et al. 2008). Although the content is specific to each bot, they all have high
tendency in using URLs for promotional purposes. Furthermore, extracting
the sentiment of tweets (Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss, Goncalves, Flammini,
et al. 2011; Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss, Goncalves, Patil, et al. 2011), language
and length of messages (Thonnard and Dacier 2011), number of URLs (Chu
et al. 2010; Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee 2011; Wang 2010), number of mentions and
similarity between all pairs of tweets posted by a user (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee
2011), and originality of tweets (Wang 2010) are all examples of using content.
• Profiles and activities: Automation involved in generating bot accounts results
in profile properties that contain detectable patterns. Bots that were working
together towards political disruption in 2011 Russian parliamentary election
were found to have similar email addresses and account creation times (Thomas,
Grier, and Paxson 2012).
Bots mostly tweet using automatic devices (Chu et al. 2010), have a shorter life
time (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee 2011), short subscriber details (Cook et al. 2014),
and use hijacked IP addresses (Thomas, Grier, and Paxson 2012). In an effort
to escape from suspension systems, the controller of bots spreads the machines
from which he launches his attacks geographically (Kanich et al. 2008).
Even when profile information is not available, the username alone can be a
bot indicator. The length of the screen name (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee 2011)
and the distance of the unigram/bigram distribution from verified names (Lee
and Kim 2014) can differentiate bots from normal users. Matching how well
the screen name matches human typing patterns can differentiate automated
users (Zafarani and Liu 2015).
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• Network structure and connections: To boost their desired effect, Twitter
bots follow normal users hoping to be followed back. To this aim they show
mass following and unfollowing behaviors and thus their connections show
different characteristics. The number of followers, number of friends, ratio of
the the friends to followers, percentage of bidirectional friends, and the standard
deviation of unique numerical IDs of followers and friends have been all used to
represent this (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee 2011).
In order to build a classifier, we need to obtain a gold standard dataset: a set of
users and their bot/human label to evaluate the results. Of course, this information
does not come affixed to each user when the researcher collects the dataset. Thus, the
onus is on the researcher to collect these labels. There are three main approaches to
this:
• Manual annotation: As in most other classification problems, manual labeling
can be to obtain ground truth. Although this method has been used widely
in this field (Chu et al. 2010; Cook et al. 2014; Grier et al. 2010; Ratkiewicz,
Conover, Meiss, Goncalves, Patil, et al. 2011; Xie et al. 2008), we still have the
challenge of how to choose annotators and how many annotators are sufficient
in order to achieve reliable labels. Furthermore, this method does not scale as it
takes time to recruit users and funds to pay them.
• Suspended users lists: This method leverages the social networking site itself to
obtain the labels. The researcher simply observes the users and sees which ones
get suspended or removed by the site. This approach is simple, but the concern
remains that the reason of suspension and deletion is not usually indicated in
such lists. Thus, many suspension lists include users who violated other rules
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and regulations of the site. Methods proposed in John et al. 2009; Lee and Kim
2014; Thomas, Grier, and Paxson 2012 use these lists.
• Honeypots: A newer ground truth acquisition method is based on using
honeypots, bots created by the researcher to lure other bots. Honeypots show
non-human behaviors and can be made in groups to increase their effect by
connecting and interacting with each other without intervention in activities of
normal users. Due to the fact that they are designed in a way that any normal
user can immediately tell they are bots, any user in the network that connects
to a honeypot will be considered as a bot. By using this method, a researcher
can gather a large set of bots active in a network with high confidence. This
method has been applied (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee 2011; Thonnard and Dacier
2011).
When building a classifier, the proposed method should be evaluated by means of
an evaluation metric. The most widely used metrics in bot detection are accuracy and
precision (Chu et al. 2010; Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee 2011; Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss,
Goncalves, Flammini, et al. 2011; Thomas, Grier, and Paxson 2012; Thonnard and
Dacier 2011; Xie et al. 2008). Although they can reach extremely high precision, few
report their recall. This drawback will have a significant effect as most of the bots
will remain undetected (low recall) at the expense of precision.
2.6 Detecting Shills in Online Social Networks
The problem of detecting shills online falls closely to three problems: crowdturfing
detection, bot detection, and detecting online activists. We organize the discussion of
our related work along these themes.
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Crowdturfing is the process of maliciously using crowdsourcing systems in order to
spread fake reviews. This is close to our problem as it involves the mass proliferation
of opinion by paid workers. In Wang et al. 2012, the authors performed an analysis
on different crowdsourcing which harbor malicious tasks such as crowdsourcing fake
reviews, and spreading disinformation about competitive brands. Lee et al. Lee,
Tamilarasan, and Caverlee 2013 furthered this line of research by proposing a machine
learning framework to detect workers on crowdsourcing sites that may facilitate
crowdturfing operations. Other researchers try to find evidence of crowdturfing
reviews by analyzing the text of the social media sites (Ott, Cardie, and J. Hancock
2012; Ott, Cardie, and J. T. Hancock 2013). While these are close to our problem,
the key difference is that these algorithms focus on review spam and the nature of
the unskilled workers in order to make these classifications. Our problem is different
because these shills are highly trained and provided with diverse “talking points” when
generating their own content.
Another related task to shill detection is bot detection. Bot detection, shill
detection, and crowdturfing all involve the use of a “controller” who directs the content
produced by the controllee (Conover et al. 2011), which is a similar structure to
the behavior of shills. Furthermore, bots are able to manipulate the discussion on a
site by mass-posting on certain topics in order to get those topics to trend on the
social networking site (Ferrara, Varol, Davis, et al. 2016). Furthermore, other work in
bot detection uses similar feature sets such as language (Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss,
Goncalves, Flammini, et al. 2011; Thonnard and Dacier 2011), and the user’s network
properties (Zafarani and Liu 2015; Thomas, Grier, and Paxson 2012). Another area
where our work dovetails with bot detection is ground truth curation. Both our
project and bot detection have the problem that a user can rarely definitively be
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proven to be a in the positive class. Instead, both problems rely on heuristics to yield
ground truth. Heuristics used in bot detection commonly include manual annotation
of user accounts (Chu et al. 2010; Cook et al. 2014), observing the social sites to see
which users the site bans for bot behavior (John et al. 2009; Lee and Kim 2014), and
creating honeypots (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee 2011; Morstatter, Wu, et al. 2016) to lure
bots into following them. We utilize the first approach as it is the most feasible to
bot detection. We train the users using the set of criteria described previously, and
ask them to label the data.
Our study can be compared with studies on the political nature of social media. The
detection of shills is similar to the identification of central political activists (Morales
et al. 2015) in that both partially rely on the content expressed by key individuals
in topics pertaining to their political representatives’ respective agendas (Ranganath
et al. 2016). Although we do indicate that the responsibility of influencing others
lies in a few key individuals, we are not studying polarization of political opinions
(Morales et al. 2015). Furthermore, our end goals differ in the specificity. While most
try to identify promoters on social media (Li et al. 2014), promoters are a different
type of user in the sense that they do not hide their identity to be seen as regular
users. More recently, Ferrara, Varol, Menczer, et al. 2016 propose a dynamic time
warping algorithm to detect users behaving in tandem on a social media site.
Our goals differ from other politically-motivated studies of social media. For
example, Morales et al. 2015 exploits the fact that political polarization tends to form
around those with extreme opinions on political issues and created a model with the
purpose of identifying these individuals. Our work differs from theirs in that although
both project are trying to find key users in the center of political conversations, we
are only trying to find paid political advocates out of these users. Another similarity
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with other existing projects is the concept of finding “hidden” political activists. For
example, Li et al. 2014 find hidden campaigns on social media. A key difference
when is the target audience. Another major difference lies in the approach: Li et al.
2014 heavily leveraged the network in their approach. Since Reddit does not have a
network, we are unable to apply this approach in our classification and instead rely
heavily upon natural language processing tools when extracting features.
There exist other political analysis projects that targeted a variety of audience
groups due to their holistic nature (Conover et al. 2011). In contrast, our targeted
audience group consists of individuals who are interested in the subject after SuperPAC
announced its involvement. While our purpose does not involve scoring each individual
on a set scale as possible shill, the process of denoting an user as a shill does slightly
involve such rating, which is heavily used in Wong et al. 2013.
2.7 Perceptual Bias in Social Data
There are hundreds of different cognitive biases recognized by the social sciences.
Many of these are catalogued in Baron 2000, and a very comprehensive list can be
found on the “List of cognitive biases” Wikipedia page.13
In this section we discuss the related work as it pertains to perceptual bias from
three different perspectives. First, since our solution heavily relies on word embeddings
to create the emoji mapping, we enumerate some recent work on word embeddings.
Next, we discuss other resources for informal text and continue to discuss other work
that has been done on emoji analysis. Finally, we discuss other work that has been
done in the context of platform-specific emoji rendering.
13https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases
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2.7.1 Developing An Emoji Mapping with Word Embeddings
One of the first word embedding algorithms was the Neural Network Language
Model (Bengio et al. 2006). Currently, one of the most famous word embedding
algorithms, Word2Vec (Mikolov et al. 2013), has risen to prominence. This algorithm
works embedding words that appear next to each other in the text next to each other
in the embedding. Word2Vec provides two approaches to solving this problem: the
“continuous bag of words” (CBOW) and the “skip-gram” (SG) architecture. While
skip-gram has been shown to better solve analogies (Mikolov, Yih, and Zweig 2013),
we compare with both approaches.
The simple rules combined with other constraints has been shown to create powerful
embeddings that work in many different settings. For example, they have been used
to produce state-of-the-art performance in the areas of syntactic parsing (Socher
et al. 2013), named entity recognition (Dhillon, Foster, and Ungar 2011), antonym
detection (Ono, Miwa, and Sasaki 2015), sentiment analysis (Maas et al. 2011; Tang,
Wei, Qin, et al. 2014; Tang, Wei, Yang, et al. 2014), and machine translation (Zou
et al. 2013). Furthermore, researchers have tried to go beyond using vectors to model
just words, and have used them to model sentences, paragraphs, and documents (Le
and Mikolov 2014).
2.7.2 Linguistic Resources for Informal Text
Before emojis were commonplace, there has been a long history of trying to
better represent and understand text, both formal and informal. One of the most
influential resources is WordNet (Miller 1995), which represents words not only by
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their definitions, but also provides a graph of the relationship between the words.
Extensions to this approach abound, but perhaps the most relevant one to our work is
SentiWordNet (Baccianella, Esuli, and Sebastiani 2010), which considers the sentiment
of the words when building the resource. In the context of informal text, SlangSD (Wu,
Morstatter, and Liu 2016) provides a sentiment resource for mapping slang words
to sentiment scores by leveraging Urban Dictionary’s data. Crowdsourcing has been
used to extract the emotional meanings for words (Mohammad and Turney 2013).
2.7.3 Emoji Analysis
As emojis have become an important tool that help people communicate and
express their emotions, the study of emojis as they pertain to sentiment classification
and text understanding is attracting attention (Barbieri et al. 2016; Barbieri, Ronzano,
and Saggion 2016; Eisner et al. 2016; Hallsmar and Palm 2016; Hu et al. 2013;
Kelly and Watts 2015; Novak et al. 2015). Hu et al. 2013 proposes a unsupervised
framework for sentiment classification by incorporating emoticon signals. Hallsmar
and Palm 2016 investigates the feasibility of an emoji training heuristic for multi-class
sentiment analysis on Twitter with a Multinomial Naive Bayes Classifier. Eisner et al.
learn emoji representation by running Skip-gram on descriptions of emojis provided
in the Unicode standard. The resulting emoji representation along with the word
embedding from Google News are used to perform sentiment analysis and the results
show that emoji representation can improve sentiment analysis. Instead of using
Unicode description, Barbieri, Ronzano, and Saggion 2016 learns the vector skip-gram
model for twitter emojis using tweets, which also demonstrate the ability of Emojis
in improving sentiment analysis. Novak et al. 2015 and Barbieri et al. 2016 analyze
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the sentiment of emojis with respect to tweet corpus of different languages, position
of emojis in text, etc. They find that there is no significant difference for emoji
usage in different languages, and people are more likely to express positive sentiments
when putting emojis at the end of their text. We build on this work by studying the
difference for emoji usage in different platforms. Kelly et al. shows that emojis can
be used as appropriations which can help facilitate communications using interview
data. Cappallo, Mensink, and Snoek 2015 propose a framework called Image2Emoji,
which combines visual and text information to guide the process of emoji scoring. Lu
et al. 2016 explores the ubiquitous usage pattern of emojis by people from different
cultures. They find that theses pattern can be applied to improve user experience
qualities for input methods and understand user preferences. Wijeratne et al. 2016
use emojis to build a sense inventory.
2.7.4 Platform Specific Emoji Rendering
The aforementioned studies on emoji analysis ignore the fact that the same emoji
unicode has different emoji images on different platform. Thus, the sentiment or
semantic meanings of the same emoji may be perceived differently for people using
different platforms and thus cause misunderstanding. Therefore, recently, there are
researchers paying attention to this issue (Miller et al. 2016; Tigwell and Flatla 2016).
Miller et al. 2016 show that emoji misinterpretation exists within and across platforms,
from both semantic and sentiment perspectives. The analysis is based on a survey
to collect people’s feedback of sentiment scores and semantic meaning on different
rendering of emojis, which does not consider the context of emojis. Similarly, Tigwell
and Flatla 2016 also explore platform-dependent emoji misinterpretation problem
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inhttp://on.wsj.com/1Qo215n. They design a questionnaire to collect user’s sentiment
feedback on 16 emojis from Android and iOS platform, and compute a valence-arousal
space to guide sentiment analysis. Different from existing approaches exploring
platform specific emoji rendering problems, we use real world data to verify the
existence of emoji ambiguity and provides a mapping-based solution to identify the
intended emoji from original posts.
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Chapter 3
DETECTING SOCIAL DATA COLLECTION BIAS
When we use social media data, we want the data we collect to be representative
of the problem we wish to study. Unfortunately, this is often not the case. As we will
demonstrate in this chapter, there are many ways in which the data we collect from
Twitter is not representative of Twitter itself, let alone any singular problem we wish
to study.
Because Twitter is so prominent for research, we need to make sure that the data
collected by researchers is “fit for purpose.” Social media data is often difficult to
obtain, with most social media sites restricting access to their data. Twitter’s policies
lie opposite to this. The “Twitter Streaming API”14 is a capability provided by Twitter
that allows anyone to retrieve at most a 1% sample of all the data by providing some
parameters. According to the documentation, the sample will return at most 1% of all
the tweets produced on Twitter at a given time. Once the number of tweets matching
the given parameters eclipses 1% of all the tweets on Twitter, Twitter will begin to
sample the data returned to the user. The methods that Twitter employs to sample
this data is currently unknown. The Streaming API takes three parameters: keywords
(words, phrases, or hashtags), geographical boundary boxes, and user ID.
One way to overcome the 1% limitation is to use the Twitter Firehose—a feed
provided by Twitter that allows access to 100% of all public tweets. A very substantial
drawback of the Firehose data is the restrictive cost. Another drawback is the sheer
Portions of this chapter have been published at ICWSM 2013 (Morstatter et al. 2013).
14https://dev.twitter.com/docs/streaming-apis
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(a) Firehose (b) Streaming API
Figure 5: Tag Cloud of Top Terms from Each Dataset.
amount of resources required to retain the Firehose data (servers, network availability,
and disk space). Consequently, researchers as well as decision makers in companies
and government institutions are forced to decide between two versions of the API:
the freely-available but limited Streaming, and the very expensive but comprehensive
Firehose version. To the best of our knowledge, no research has been done to assist
those researchers and decision makers by answering the following: How does the use
of the Streaming API affect common measures and metrics performed on the data?
In this article we answer this question from different perspectives.
We begin the analysis by employing classic statistical measures commonly used
to compare two sets of data. Based on unique characteristics of tweets, we design
and conduct additional comparative analysis. By extracting topics using a frequently
used algorithm, we compare how topics differ between the two datasets. As tweets
are linked data, we perform network measures of the two datasets. Because tweets
can be geo-tagged, we compare the geographical distribution of geolocated tweets to
better understand how sampling affects aggregated geographic information.
37
3.1 A Dataset for Detecting Bias
From December 14th, 2011 - January 10th, 2012 we collected tweets from the
Twitter Firehose matching any of the keywords, geographical bounding boxes, and
users in Table 1. During the same time period, we collected tweets from the Streaming
API using TweetTracker (S Kumar et al. 2011) with exactly the same parameters.
During the time we collected 528,592 tweets from the Streaming API and 1,280,344
tweets from the Firehose. The raw counts of tweets we received each day from both
sources are shown in Figure 6. One of the more interesting results in this dataset is
that as the data in the Firehose spikes, the Streaming API coverage is reduced. One
possible explanation for this phenomenon could be that due to the Western holidays
observed at this time, activity on Twitter may have reduced causing the 1% threshold
to go down.
One of the key questions we ask is how the amount of coverage affects measures
commonly performed on Twitter data. Here we define coverage as the ratio of data
from the Streaming API to data from the Firehose. To better understand the coverage
of the Streaming API for each day, we construct a box-and-whisker plot to visualize
the distribution of daily coverage, shown in Figure 7. In this period of time the
Streaming API receives, on average, 43.5% of the data available on the Firehose on
any given day. While this is much better than just 1% of the tweets promised by the
Streaming API, we have no reference point for the data in the tweets we received.
The most striking observation is the range of coverage rates (see Figure 7). Increase
of absolute importance (more global awareness) or relative importance (the overall
number of tweets decreases) result in lower coverage as well as fewer tweets. To give
38
1
2
-1
4
1
2
-1
5
1
2
-1
6
1
2
-1
7
1
2
-1
8
1
2
-1
9
1
2
-2
0
1
2
-2
1
1
2
-2
2
1
2
-2
3
1
2
-2
4
1
2
-2
5
1
2
-2
6
1
2
-2
7
1
2
-2
8
1
2
-2
9
1
2
-3
0
1
2
-3
1
0
1
-0
1
0
1
-0
2
0
1
-0
3
0
1
-0
4
0
1
-0
5
0
1
-0
6
0
1
-0
7
0
1
-0
8
0
1
-0
9
0
1
-1
00
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
N
o
. 
T
w
e
e
ts
Dataset Tweets per Day
Streaming
Firehose
Figure 6: Raw Tweet Counts for Each Day from Both the Streaming API and the
Firehose.
Table 1: Parameters Used to Collect Data from Syria. Coordinates Below the Boundary
Box Indicate the Southwest and Northeast Corner, Respectively. The Last Keyword
Is the Arabic Word for “Syria.”
Keywords Geoboxes Users
#syria, #assad, #alep-
povolcano, #alawite,
#homs, #hama, #tar-
tous, #idlib, #damas-
cus, #daraa, #aleppo,
#houla, #
@SyrianRevo
(32.8, 35.9), (37.3, 42.3)
the reader a sense for the top words in both datasets, we include tag clouds for the
top words in the Streaming API and the Firehose, shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 7: Distribution of Coverage for the Streaming Data by Day. Whiskers Indicate
Extreme Values.
3.2 Statistical Measures
We investigate the statistical properties of the two datasets with the intent of
understanding how well the characteristics of the sampled data match those of the
Firehose. We begin first by comparing the top hashtags in the tweets for different
levels of coverage using a rank correlation statistic. We continue to extract topics
from the text, matching topical content and comparing topical distribution to better
understand how sampling affects the results of this common process performed on
Twitter data. In both cases we compare our streaming data to random datasets
obtained by sampling the data obtained through the Firehose.
3.2.1 Top Hashtag Analysis
Hashtags are an important communication device on Twitter. Users employ them
to annotate the content they produce, allowing for other users to find their tweets
and to facilitate interaction on the platform. Also, adding a hashtag to a tweet is
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equivalent to joining a community of users discussing the same topic (Yang et al.
2012). In addition, hashtags are also used by Twitter to calculate the trending topics
of the day, which encourages the user to post in these communities.
Recently, hashtags have become an important part of Twitter analysis (M. Efron
2010; Tsur and Rappoport 2012; Recuero and Araujo 2012). For both the purpose of
community formation and trend analysis it is important that our Streaming dataset
convey the same importance for hashtags as the Firehose data. Here we compare the
top hashtags in the two datasets using Kendall’s τ rank correlation coefficient (Agresti
2010).
Kendall’s τ of Top Hashtags
Kendall’s τ is a statistic which measures the correlation of two ordered lists by
analyzing the number of concordant pairs between them. Consider two hashtags, #A
and #B. If both lists rank #A higher than #B, then this is considered a concordant
pair, otherwise it is counted as a discordant pair. Ties are handled using the τβ
statistic as follows:
τβ =
|PC | − |PD|√
(|PC |+ |PD|+ |TF |)(|PC |+ |PD|+ |TS|)
(3.1)
where PC is the set of concordant pairs, PD is the set of discordant pairs, TF is the set
of ties in the Firehose data, but not in the Streaming data, TS is the number of ties
found in the Streaming data, but not in the Firehose, and n is the number of pairs in
total. The τβ value ranges from -1, perfect negative correlation, to 1, perfect positive
correlation.
To understand the relationship between n and the resulting correlation, τβ, we
construct a chart showing the value of τβ for n between 10 and 1000 in steps of 10.
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Figure 8: Relationship between n - Number of Top Hashtags, and the Correlation
Coefficient, τβ.
To get an accurate representation of the differences in correlation at each level of
Streaming coverage, we select five days with different levels of coverage as motivated
by Figure 7: The minimum (December 27th), lower quartile (December 24th), median
(December 29th), upper quartile (December 18th), and the maximum (December
19th). The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 8. Here we see mixed results
at small values of n, indicating that the Streaming data may not be good for finding
the top hashtags. At larger values of n, we see that the Streaming API does a better
job of estimating the top hashtags in the Firehose data.
42
0 200 400 600 800 1000
n
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
ta
u
Top Hashtags - Firehose and Random Samples
Min
Q1
Median
Q3
Max
Figure 9: Random Sampling of Firehose Data. Relationship between n - Number of
Top Hashtags, and τβ - The Correlation Coefficient for Different Levels of Coverage.
Comparison with Random Samples
After seeing the results from the previous section, we are left to wonder if the
results are an artifact of using the Streaming API or if we could have obtained the
same results by any random sampling. Would we obtain the same results with a
random sample of equal size from the Firehose data, or does the Streaming API’s
filtering mechanism give us an advantage? To answer this question we repeat the
experiments for each day in the previous section. This time, instead of using Streaming
API data, we select tweets uniformly at random (without replacement) until we have
amassed the same number of tweets as we collected from the Streaming API for that
day. We repeat this process 100 times and obtain results as shown in Figure 9. Here
we see that the levels of coverage in the random and Streaming data have comparable
τβ values for large n, however at smaller n we see a much different picture. The
43
random data gets very high τβ scores for n = 10, showing a good capacity for finding
the top hashtags in the dataset. The Streaming API data does not consistently find
the top hashtags, in some cases revealing reverse correlation with the Firehose data at
smaller n. This could be indicative of a filtering process in Twitter’s Streaming API
which causes a misrepresentation of top hashtags in the data.
3.2.2 Topic Analysis
Topic models are statistical models which discover topics in a corpus. Topic
modeling is especially useful in large data, where it is too cumbersome to extract
the topics manually. Due to the large volume of tweets published on Twitter, topic
modeling has become central to many content-based studies using Twitter data
(Kireyev, Palen, and Anderson 2009; Pozdnoukhov and Kaiser 2011; Hong et al. 2012;
Yin et al. 2011; Chae et al. 2012). We compare the topics drawn from the Streaming
data with those drawn from the Firehose data using a widely-used topic modeling
algorithm, latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003). Latent
Dirichlet allocation is an algorithm for the automated discovery of topics. LDA treats
documents as a mixture of topics, and topics as a mixture of words. Each topic
discovered by LDA is represented by a probability distribution which conveys the
affinity for a given word to that particular topic. We analyze these distributions to
understand the differences between the topics discovered in the two datasets. To get
a sense of how the topics found in the Streaming data compare with those found
with random samples, we compare with topics found by running LDA on random
subsamples of the Firehose data.
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Figure 10: The Jensen-Shannon Divergence of the Matched Topics at Different Levels
of Coverage. The X-Axis Is the Binned Divergence. No Divergence Was > 0.15. The
Y-Axis Is the Count of each Bin. µ Is the Average Divergence of the Matched Topics,
σ Is the Standard Deviation.
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Figure 11: The Distribution of Average Jensen-Shannon Divergences in the Random
Data (Blue Curve), with the Single Average Obtained through the Streaming Data
(Red, Vertical Line). Z Indicates the Number of Standard Deviations the Streaming
Data Is from the Mean of the Random Samples.
Topic Discovery
Here we compare the topics generated using the Firehose corpus with those
generated using the Streaming corpus. LDA takes, in addition to the corpus, three
parameters as its input: K - the number of topics, α - a hyperparameter for the
Dirichlet prior topic distribution, and η - a hyperparameter for the Dirichlet prior
word distribution. Choosing optimal parameters is a very challenging problem, and is
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not our focus. Instead we focus on the similarity of the results given by LDA using
identical parameters on both the Streaming and Firehose corpus. We set K = 100
as suggested by Dumais et al. 1988 and use priors of α = 50/K, and η = 0.01. The
software we used to discover the topics is the gensim software package (Rehurek and
Sojka 2010). We select the same days as we did for the comparison of Kendall’s τ .
Topic Comparison
To understand the differences between the topics generated by LDA, we compute
the distance in their probability distribution using the Jensen-Shannon divergence
metric (Lin, Jan). Since LDA’s topics have no implicit orderings we first must match
them based upon the similarity of the words in the distribution. To do the matching
we construct a weighted bipartite graph between the topics from the Streaming API
and the Firehose. Treating each topic as a bag of words, we use the Jaccard score
between the words in a Streaming topic T Si and a Firehose topic T Fj as the weight of
the edges in the graph,
d(T Si , T
F
j ) =
|T Si ∩ T Fj |
|T Si ∪ T Fj |
. (3.2)
After constructing the graph we use the maximum weight matching algorithm proposed
in Galil 1986 to find the best matches between topics from the Streaming and Firehose
data. After making the ideal matches, we then compute the Jensen-Shannon divergence
between the two topics. Treating each topic as a probability distribution, we compute
this as follows:
JS(T Si ||T Fj ) =
1
2
[KL(T Si ||M) +KL(T Fj ||M)], (3.3)
whereM = 1
2
(T Si +T
F
j ) and KL is the Kullback-Liebler divergence (Cover and Thomas
2006). We compute the Jensen-Shannon divergence for each matched pair and plot
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a histogram of the values in Figure 10. We see a trend of higher divergence with
lower coverage, and lower divergence with higher coverage. This shows that decreased
coverage in the Streaming data causes variance in the discovered topics.
Comparison with Random Samples
In order to get additional perspective on the accuracy of the topics discovered in
the Streaming data, we compare the Streaming data with data sampled randomly
from the Firehose, as we did earlier to compare the correlation. First, we compute
the average of the Jensen-Shannon scores from the Streaming data in Figure 10, S.
We then repeat this process for each of the 100 runs with random data, each run
called xi. Next, we use maximum-likelihood estimation (Casella and Berger 2001) to
estimate the parameters of the Gaussian distribution from which these points originate,
µˆ = 1
100
∑100
i=1 xi, and σˆ =
√
1
100
∑100
i=1(xi − µˆ)2. Finally, we compute the z-Score for
S, z = S−µˆ
σˆ
. This score gives us a concrete measure of the difference between the
Streaming API data and the random samples. Results of this experiment, including
z-Scores are shown in Figure 11. Nonetheless, we are still able to get topics from the
Streaming API that are close to those found in random data with higher levels of
coverage. A threshold of 3-sigma is often used in the literature to indicate extreme
values Guthrie 2010, Section 6.3.1. With this threshold, we see that overall we are
able to get significantly better topics with the random data than with the Streaming
API on 4 of the 5 days.
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3.3 Network Measures
Because Twitter is a social network, Twitter data can be analyzed with methods
from Social Network Analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994) in addition to statistical
measures. Possible 1-mode and 2-mode networks are: User × User retweet networks,
User × Hashtag content networks, Hashtag × Hashtag co-occurrence networks. For
the purpose of this article we focus on User × User retweet networks. Users who send
tweets within a certain time period are the nodes in the network. Furthermore, users
that are retweeted within this time period are also nodes in this network, regardless
of the time their original tweet was tweeted. The networks created by this procedure
are directed and not symmetric by design, however, bi-directional links are possible
in case a→ b and b→ a. We ignore line weight created by multiple a→ b retweets
and self-loops (yes, some user retweet themselves). For the network metrics, the
comparison is done on both the network, and the node levels. Networks are analyzed
using ORA (Carley et al. 2012).
3.3.1 Node-Level Measures
The node-level comparison is accomplished by calculating measures at the user-
level and comparing these results. We calculate three different centrality measures at
the node level, two of which—Degree Centrality and Betweenness Centrality—were
defined by Freeman as “distinct intuitive conceptions of centrality” (Freeman 1979, p.
215). Degree Centrality counts the number of neighbors in unweighted networks. In
particular, we are interested in In-Degree Centrality as this reveals highly respected
sources of information in the retweet network (where directed edges point to the
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Table 2: Average Centrality Measures for Twitter Retweet Networks for 28 Daily
Networks. “All” Is All 28 Days Together.
Measure k = Top−k
(min-max)
All
In-Degree 10 4.21 (0–9) 4
In-Degree 100 53.4
(36–82)
73
Potential
Reach
100 59.2
(32–83)
80
Betweenness 100 54.8
(41–81)
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source). Betweenness Centrality (Freeman 1979) identifies brokerage positions in
the Twitter networks that connect different communities with each other or funnel
different information sources. Furthermore, we calculate the Potential Reach which
counts the number of nodes that are reachable in the network weighted with the
path distance. In our Twitter networks this is equivalent to the inverse in-distance of
reachable nodes (Sabidussi 1966). This approach results in a metric that finds sources
of information (users) that potentially can reach many other nodes on short path
distances. Before calculating these measures, we extract the main component and
delete all other nodes (see next sub-section). In general, centrality measures are used
to identify important nodes. Therefore, we calculate the number of top 10 and top
100 nodes that can be correctly identified with the Streaming data. Table 2 shows
the results for the average of 28 daily networks, the min-max range, as well as the
aggregated network including all 28 days.
Although, we know from previous studies (Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt 2006)
that there is a very low likelihood that the ranking will be correct when handling
networks with missing data, the accuracy of the daily results is not very satisfying.
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When we look at the results of the individual days, we can see that the matches
have, once again, a broad range as a function of the data coverage rate. In Borgatti,
Carley, and Krackhardt 2006 the authors argue that network measures are stable
for denser networks. Twitter data, being very sparse, causes the network metrics’
accuracy to be rather low in the case when the data sub-sample is smaller. However,
identifying ∼50% key-players correctly for a single day is reasonable, and accuracy
can be increased by using longer observation periods. Even more, the Potential Reach
metrics are quite stable for some days in the aggregated data.
3.3.2 Network-Level Measures
We complement our node-level analysis by comparing various metrics at the
network level. These metrics are reported in Table 3 and are calculated as follows.
Since retweet networks create a lot of small disconnected components, we focus only
on the size of the largest component. The size of the main component and the
fact that all smaller components contain less than 1% of the nodes justify our focus
on the main component for this data. Therefore, we reduce the networks to their
largest component before we proceed with the calculations. To describe the structure
of the retweet networks we calculate the clustering coefficient, a measure for local
density (Watts and Strogatz 1998). We do not take all possible triads of directed
networks into account, but treat the networks as undirected when calculating the
clustering coefficient. Din > 0 shows the proportion of nodes in the largest component
that are retweeted and max(Din) shows the value of the highest unscaled In-Degree
value, i.e., number of unique users retweeting the same single user. The final three
lines of Table 3 are network centralization indexes based on the node-level measures
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that have been introduced in the previous paragraph. Freeman 1979 describes the
centralization CX of a network for any given metric as the difference of the value
CX(p∗) of the most central node to all other node values compared to the maximum
possible difference:
CX =
∑
i = 1n[CX(p∗)− CX(pi)]
max
∑
i = 1n[CX(p∗)− CX(pi)] (3.4)
High centralization indicates a network with some nodes having very high node-level
values and many nodes with low values while low centralization is the result of evenly
distributed node-level measures.
We do not discuss all details of the individual results but focus on the differences
between the two data sources. First, the coverage of nodes and links is similar to
the coverage of tweets. This is a good indicator that the sub-sample is not biased to
the specific Twitter user (e.g. high activity). The smaller proportion of nodes with
non-zero In-Degree for the Firehose shows us that the larger number of nodes includes
many more peripheral nodes. A low Clustering Coefficient implies that networks are
hierarchical rather than interacting communities. Even though the centralization
indexes are rather similar, there is one very interesting result when looking at the
individual days: The range of values is much higher for the Streaming data as a result
of the high coverage fluctuation. Further research will analyze whether we can use
network metrics to better estimate how sufficient the sampled Streaming data is.
3.4 Geographic Measures
The final facet of the Twitter data we compare is the geolocation of the tweets.
Geolocation is an important part of a tweet, and the study of the location of content
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Table 3: Comparison of Network-Level Social Network Analysis Metrics.
Firehose Streaming API
Metrics avg.day 28
days
avg.day 28
days
nodes 6,590 73,719 2,466
(37.4%)
30,894
(41.9%)
links 10,173 204,022 3,667
(36.0%)
76,750
(37.6%)
Din > 0 25.1% 19.3% 32.4% 20.5%
max(Din) 341 2,956 167.3 1,252
main comp. 5,609 70,383 2,069 28,701
main comp.
%
84.6% 95.5% 82.5% 92.9%
Clust.Coef. 0.029 0.053 0.033 0.050
DCin Centr. 0.059 0.042 0.085 0.043
BC Centr. 0.010 0.053 0.010 0.050
PReach
Centr.
0.130 0.240 0.156 0.205
and users is currently an active area of research (Cheng, Caverlee, and Lee 2010;
Wakamiya, Lee, and Sumiya 2011). We study how the geographic distribution of the
geolocated tweets is affected by the sampling performed by the Streaming API.
The number of geotagged tweets is low, with only 16,739 geotagged tweets in the
Streaming data (3.17%) and 18,579 in the Firehose data (1.45%). We notice that
despite the difference in tweets collected on the whole we get 90.10% coverage of
geotagged tweets. We start by grouping the locations of tweets by continent and can
find a strong Asian bias due to the boundary box we used to collect the data from both
sources, shown in Table 1. To better understand the distribution of geotagged tweets
we repeat the same process, this time excluding tweets originating in the boundary
box set in the parameters. After removing these tweets, more than 90% of geotagged
Tweets from both sources are excluded from the data and the Streaming coverage
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Table 4: Geotagged Tweet Location by Continent. Excluding Boundary Box from
Parameters.
Continent Firehose Streaming Error
Africa 156 (5.74%) 33 (3.10%) -2.64%
Antarctica 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) ±0.00%
Asia 932 (34.26%) 321 (30.11%) -4.15%
Europe 300 (11.03%) 139 (13.04%) +2.01%
Mid-Ocean 765 (28.12%) 295 (27.67%) -0.45%
N. America 607 (22.32%) 293 (27.49%) +5.17%
Oceania 54 (1.98%) 15 (1.41%) -0.57%
S. America 3 (0.11%) 2 (0.19%) +0.08%
Total 2720 (100.00%) 1066 (100.00%) ±0.00%
level is reduced to 39.19%. The distribution of tweets by continent is shown in Table 4.
Here we see a more even representation of the tweets’ locations in Asia and North
America.
3.5 Discussion
In this chapter we asked whether data obtained through Twitter’s sampled Stream-
ing API is a sufficient representation of activity on Twitter as a whole. To answer
this question we collected data with exactly the same parameters from both the free,
but limited, Streaming API and the unlimited, but costly, Firehose. We provide
a methodology for comparing the two multifaceted sets of data and results of our
analysis.
We started our analysis by understanding the coverage of the Streaming API data,
finding that when the number of tweets matching the set of parameters increases, the
Streaming API’s coverage is reduced. One way to mitigate this might be to create
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more specific parameter sets with different users, bounding boxes, and keywords. This
way we might be able to extract more data from the Streaming API.
Next, we studied the statistical differences between the two datasets. We used
a common correlation coefficient to understand the differences between the top n
hashtags in the two datasets. We find that the Streaming API data estimates the top
hashtags for a large n well, but is often misleading when n is small. We also employed
LDA to extract topics from the text. We compare the probability distribution of
the words from the most closely-matched topics and find that they are most similar
when the coverage of the Streaming API is greatest. That is, topical analysis is most
accurate when we get more data from the Streaming API.
The Streaming API provides just one example of how sampling Twitter data
affects measures. We leverage the Firehose data to get additional samples to better
understand the results from the Streaming API. In both of the above experiments we
compare the Streaming data with 100 datasets sampled randomly from the Firehose
data. We compare the statistical properties to find that the Streaming API performs
worse than randomly sampled data, especially at low coverage. We find that in the
case of top hashtag analysis, the Streaming API sometimes reveals negative correlation
in the top hashtags, while the randomly sampled data exhibits very high positive
correlation with the Firehose data. In the case of LDA we find a significant increase
in the accuracy of LDA with the randomly sampled data over the data from the
Streaming API. Both of these results indicate some bias in the way that the Streaming
API provides data to the user.
By analyzing retweet User × User networks we were able to show that we can
identify, on average, 50–60% of the top 100 key-players when creating the networks
based on one day of Streaming API data. Aggregating some days of data can increase
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the accuracy substantially. For network level measures, first in-depth analysis revealed
interesting correlation between network centralization indexes and the proportion of
data covered by the Streaming API.
Finally, we inspect the properties of the geotagged tweets from both sources.
Surprisingly, we find that the Streaming API almost returns the complete set of the
geotagged tweets despite sampling. We attribute this to the geographic boundary
box. Although the number of geotagged tweets is still very small in general (∼1%),
researchers using this information can be confident that they work with an almost
complete sample of Twitter data when geographic boundary boxes are used for data
collection. When we remove the tweets collected this way, we see a much larger
disparity in the tweets from both datasets. Even with this disparity, we see a similar
distribution based on continent.
Overall, we find that the results of using the Streaming API depend strongly
on the coverage and the type of analysis that the researcher wishes to perform.
This leads to the next question concerning the estimation of how much data we
actually get in a certain time period. We suggest that we found first evidence in
different types of analysis that can help us to estimate the Streaming API coverage.
Uncovering the nuances of the Streaming API will help researchers, business analysts,
and governmental institutions to better ground their scientific results based on Twitter
data.
Looking forward, we hope to find methods to compensate for the biases in the
Streaming API to provide a more accurate picture of Twitter activity to researchers.
Provided further access to Twitter’s Firehose, we will determine whether the method-
ology presented here will yield similar results for Twitter data collected from other
domains, such as natural disaster, protest, and elections.
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Chapter 4
ASSESSING AND MITIGATING SOCIAL DATA COLLECTION BIAS
In this chapter we introduce two approaches to addressing the problem of overcom-
ing social data bias. The first is based upon identifying bias in a previously-collected
social media dataset. The second is based upon collecting social media data in such a
way that the resulting dataset contains less data collection bias than it would have if
the data had been collected in another way.
4.1 Assessing Bias in Previously Collected Datasets
Twitter is a microblogging site where users share short, 140-character messages
called “tweets”. Twitter has become one of the largest social networking sites in
the world with 240 million users who publish 500 million tweets each day15 from
their web browsers and mobile phones. Due to Twitter’s massive size and ease
of mobile publication, Twitter has also become a central tool for communication
during protests (Campbell 2011) and disasters (Humanitarianism in the Network Age
2012). This has caused an immense push from both the computer and social science
research communities who have used data from the site for wide applications of social
media research from predicting users’ location (Cheng, Caverlee, and Lee 2010) or to
characterize the life cycle of news stories (Castillo et al. 2014).
Portions of this chapter have been published at WWW 2014 (Morstatter, Pfeffer, and Liu 2014)
and Hypertext 2015 (Sampson et al. 2015).
15https://blog.twitter.com/2013/new-tweets-per-second-record-and-how
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One way to get around the 1% limit is to purchase the Twitter Firehose, a feed
offered by Twitter that allows for access to 100% of all of the public tweets posted
on the site. Simply comparing the results from the Streaming API with the Firehose
is one way to verify the results of the sampled service. This is the approach taken
in Morstatter et al. 2013. Unfortunately, verifying results using the Firehose is not an
option for most researchers as access to Twitter’s Firehose is restrictively expensive
and access is limited to users with a business agreement with Twitter16.
In this chapter, the word “bias” only pertains to sample bias. We say that a
hashtag is “biased” if the relative trend is statistically significantly over-represented
or underrepresented in contrast to its true trend on Twitter. In particular, we are
looking for particular time periods of bias in the Streaming API. Based on Twitter’s
documentation, the sample size is determined by the volume of a query at a point
in time. There are times when the sample is representative, and times when it is
biased. We try to find time periods where the data from the Streaming API is biased,
meaning not an accurate representation of the true activity on Twitter.
The focus of this chapter lies in finding and assessing an alternative method for
bias detection in the Streaming API. Our goal is to detect the bias automatically,
using methods that are openly available to researchers. We begin this process by
discussing the related work, which includes a discussion of other work that discovers
bias in the Streaming API. We continue to introduce and vet another data source, the
Sample API17, and propose a methodology that utilizes this data source to show a
user when there is bias in the results of their Streaming API query. Finally, we show
that the Streaming API gives nearly the same results to identical queries originating
16https://dev.twitter.com/discussions/2752
17https://dev.twitter.com/docs/api/1/get/statuses/sample
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from different points around the world, and to identical queries started at different
points in time during the overlap of their execution.
4.1.1 Discovering Bias in the Streaming API without the Firehose
With work showing evidence that the Streaming API is biased, researchers must
be able to tell whether their Streaming API sample is biased. Vetting their dataset
using the methodology proposed with the Firehose is prohibitive for many reasons.
We propose a methodology that can give an indication of bias for a particular hashtag.
In this section, we investigate whether another open data source, Twitter’s Sample
API, can be used to find bias in the Streaming API. We show that using the Sample
API, one can accurately detect bias in the Streaming API without the need of the
prohibitive Firehose. We focus on alternative methods to help the user understand
when their data diverges from the true activity on Twitter. We continue to show that
not only can one find the bias using this method, but that these results are consistent
regardless of when and where the Streaming API query was issued.
Validation of the Streaming API
We define the true trend of a particular hashtag, h as a function, f(h). We define
the trend of h as it is conveyed through the Streaming API as t(h). To make this
estimation, we consider another freely-available open Twitter data source, the Sample
API. Unlike the Streaming API, the Sample API takes no parameters and returns
a 1% sample of all of the Tweets produced on Twitter. Here, we empirically assess
the Sample API’s ability to return a truly random sample and continue to build a
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Table 5: Data Collected to Test Bias Detection Approach Introduced in This Chapter.
Data Source Keywords No. Tweets
Firehose (Gnip) syria 214,383
Sample API N/A 734,172
Table 6: Significance Levels of τβ Statistic for Top K Hashtags, Sample API vs.
Firehose. All Lists of Size Greater Than 40 Had p-Values < 10−6.
Top-k τβ p-value
10 0.988826 0.000069
20 0.778663 0.000001
30 0.655072 0.000001
40 0.549759 0.000002
50 0.604880 < 10−6
... ... ...
450 0.476931 < 10−6
framework to compare the Streaming API data with the Firehose using the Sample
API as a proxy. We call the trend from the Sample API s(h). Given the sparsity of
the Sample API, it is likely impossible to find the real trend f(h) from s(h), however
s(h) can be used as an indicator to understand when t(h) is biased.
Vetting the Randomness of the Sample API
Given the evidence of bias that was observed in the Streaming API, we must
proceed with caution before using the Sample API as a surrogate gold standard. We
begin our assessment of the randomness of the Sample API by collecting data from
the feed. We collect all of the tweets available through the Sample API on 2013-08-30
from 17:00 - 21:00 UTC, and post-filter them by the keyword “syria”. Simultaneously,
we collect all of the tweets matching the keyword “syria” from the Gnip Twitter feed.
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The Gnip18 feed is another outlet for Firehose data, it also provides 100% of the
publicly-available Tweets on Twitter. We report the keywords and the collection
volume for this dataset in Table 5.
To verify the validity of this source we compare the ranked list of top hashtags in
both sets. We first plot Kendall’s τβ score of the Sample API against the Firehose.
Kendall’s τβ calculates the number of concordant and discordant pairs between two
ranked lists. This score gives us a sense of whether the frequency of hashtags coming
through the Sample API is the same as the Firehose. We plot the average and standard
deviation of 100 perfectly randomly sampled datasets of the same size as the Sample
API against the Firehose. A plot of the rank correlation in the top hashtags from the
Firehose and the Sample API is shown in Figure 12.
Overall we see that the shape of the trend of the Sample API closely resembles that
of the random samples, a promising sign that the Sample API is unbiased. However,
we still see that the τβ values occasionally fall outside of one standard deviation of
the distribution of random samples. We perform a statistical test to ensure that the
Sample data and Firehose data are not independent. To perform the statistical test
we calculate two-sided significance level from the Kendall τ statistic, which tests the
following hypothesis:
H0 – The top k hashtags in the Firehose data and the top k hashtags in the Sample
API data are independent, τβ = 0.
The results of this experiment at varying levels of k are shown in Table 6. In all
cases we are able to reject H0 with a 95% confidence level. The strong correlation
between the top hashtags and the strong similarity between the two distributions
demonstrates that the Sample API is representative of the true activity on the Firehose.
18http://gnip.com/
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Figure 12: Rank Correlation of Sample API and Gnip Firehose. Relationship between
n - Number of Top Hashtags, and τβ - the Correlation Coefficient for Different Levels
of Coverage.
With the revelation that the Sample API is a random sample of the Firehose,
one might be tempted to simply use this as a replacement for the Streaming API,
post-filtering the Sample API’s data to suit their needs. While this is correct from
the perspective of data sampling, this approach will lead to a massive loss in data.
For example, assume that a query matches 10% of the data on the Firehose. Filtering
the Sample API will give us a dataset that is 0.1% of the size of the Firehose, but
unbiased. The Streaming API’s sometimes-biased sampling method will give us a
1% sample of the Firehose that is 10x larger than the Sample API. This may be
counterintuitive as larger samples have a greater chance of being unbiased, however
since the issue resides in the sampling methodology of the Streaming API a sample of
any size from this source has the potential to be biased. The size difference between
the two sources cannot be ignored. Instead, we will use the Sample API to identify
periods of bias in the Streaming API.
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(a) Streaming API Results. Trendline for “#be-
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(b) Sample API Results. Trendline for “#be-
lievemovie” over one day.
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(c) Trendlines from 100 bootstrapped samples
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Figure 13: Figures Outlining Different Steps of the Process for Finding Bias in the
Streaming API.
Finding Bias in the Trend of a Hashtag
Now that we know that the Sample API gives us an unbiased picture of Twitter’s
Firehose, we can continue to construct a framework that incorporates this source to
find bias. Herein, we propose a methodology that finds the bias in the Streaming API
and reports to the user collecting the data when there is likely bias in the data.
With only one unbiased view from the Sample API, it is difficult to understand
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what we should expect from our Streaming API data. When the results from both
sources match there is clearly no problem. When there is a difference how do we know
if the relative error between the Sample API and the Streaming API at one time
step is significant or if it is just a small deviation from a random sample? To better
understand the Sample API’s response, we bootstrap (B. Efron 1987) the Sample API
to obtain a confidence interval for the relative activity for the hashtag at a given time
step.
We begin by normalizing both the Sample API and Streaming API time series.
This is done by calculating the mean, and standard deviation of each of the counts
in the time series. Finally, we normalize each point by its standard score, which is
calculated as:
Standard_Score(ti) =
ti − µT
σT
, (4.1)
where µT and σT are the mean and standard deviation of all of the time periods in
the time series, respectively, and ti is an individual time series point. This is done to
ensure that the distribution of points from both time series is N (0, 1). We create 100
bootstrapped samples for each hashtag. We then extract the time series data from
each sample and normalize them as we did before. This gives us a distribution of
readings for each time period in the dataset. Next, we compare this distribution to
the normalized time series from the Streaming API to detect the bias. We take the
sample mean and sample standard deviation of this distribution at each point ti as µbi
and σbi . Borrowing the threshold used in control charts (Ryan 2011), we say that any
Streaming API value at time ti that is outside of ±3σti is biased.
We show a full example of our method in Figure 13. We enumerate the process
for a single hashtag, “#believemovie” on August 5th, 2013. We choose this hashtag
as it is one of the most frequent hashtags on this day. The process begins with the
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time series data for this hashtag from both the Streaming and Sample APIs, shown
in Figures 13a and 13b, respectively. Looking at the two figures, we immediately
see a difference in the trends of this hashtag from the two sources. To obtain a
confidence interval on the difference of the two sources, we create 100 bootstrapped
samples. The time series extracted from these samples are shown in Figure 13c.
Finally, taking the mean and 3 standard deviations of the bootstrapped samples at
each time point, we obtain the confidence intervals seen in Figure 13d. We make
several observations from Figure 13d. First, a spike that occurs between hours 10
and 11 is underrepresented in the Streaming data. Also, the spikes that appear after
hour 16 are both over-represented in the Streaming API. Due to the nature of our
bootstrapping method, these observations are all statistically significant at the 99.7%
confidence interval.
Signal Usability Under Sparsity
One potential drawback of our method lies in the sparsity of the Sample API.
Accounting for only 1% of the Firehose, the “long tail” of hashtags will largely be
ignored by the Sample API. This is problematic for researchers who wish to verify
their Streaming API query’s results when their query is focused upon hashtags that
do not see a lot of activity as a fraction of the entire activity on Twitter. One
counterargument is that these kinds of queries will likely not eclipse the 1% threshold,
and in general will be unbiased.
One observation we make is that the times where our bootstrapping method will
be futile is in times where there is data for the hashtag from the Streaming API
and no data from the Sample API. In such cases, a bootstrapping approach will give
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Figure 14: Cumulative Known Zeros Ranked by Hashtag Popularity. We See That the
Most Popular Hashtags Have Relatively Few Points of Missing Data, While the Less
Popular Hashtags Have Many More. To Help the Reader Separate the Higher-Ranked
Hashtags’ Missing Values, We Plot the x-Axis on a Log Scale.
us a degenerate distribution with mean 0, not allowing for meaningful comparison
between the sources. We test the sparsity of the Sample API by finding “known zeros”,
hashtags seen in the results of the Streaming API query, but not in the Sample API
for a particular time unit.
Figure 14 shows the number of known zeros in the top 1,000 hashtags, with each
hashtag ordered by frequency. Here, we see that the first hashtags are nearly perfect,
with a total of only 4 known zeros in the top 10 hashtags. However, as we continue
down the list, we begin to see more and more known-zeros. While this method helps
researchers to find bias in their Streaming API queries, there are still many hours for
many hashtags where no claim can be made about the validity of the data.
4.1.2 Geographic and Temporal Stability of Queries
In addition to tackling the bias problem, we also analyze the stability of the results
when the data are collected in different geographic areas, and for queries started at
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different times. Do identical Streaming API queries started at different times get
different responses during the overlap of their execution? Do identical Streaming API
queries get different responses if they are executed from different geographical regions?
To ensure that the results obtained in this chapter hold for researchers outside of the
US, we assess whether Twitter issues the same results to identical queries.
To answer these questions, we collected data from the Streaming API in both the
United States (USA) and Austria (AT) with the following scheme: every 20 minutes,
we start a query that lasts for 30 minutes. For example, queryUSA1 and queryAT1 collect
tweets from 00:00 - 00:30 UTC, queryUSA2 and queryAT2 from 00:20 - 00:50 UTC, and
queryUSA3 and queryAT3 from 00:40 - 01:10 UTC, and so on. Each query is configured
with exactly the same parameters. In structuring our queries this way, we can control
both for time, and for location. By looking at the 10-minute overlaps in the adjacent
within-country queries (i.e. all queryCi and queryCi+1), we can gain an understanding
of whether identical queries started at different times get the same results. By looking
at entire queries across countries (i.e. queryUSAi and queryATi ), we can understand
whether identical queries started at the the same time from different locations get the
same results.
The data we collected spans from 2013-10-20 06:20 UTC - 2013-10-22 22:20 UTC.
Each query starts exactly on the 20-minute interval and lasts for exactly 30 minutes.
In this way, we collect 194 datasets in total from each country. In the between-country
case, we compare the entire dataset as both queries are running in both locations. In
the between-time case, we only compare the 10-minute overlaps between queryCi and
queryCi+1.
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Table 7: Number of Comparisons, Median, Average, and Standard Deviation of Twitter
ID Jaccard Scores across All Comparisons. Because the Temporal Comparisons Are
between Query, We Have One Less Than in the Geographic Comparison.
Comparison N Median Mean σ
Geographic Comparison 194 0.976 0.941 0.092
USA Time Comparison 193 0.996 0.995 0.003
Austria Time Comparison 193 0.996 0.942 0.186
Between-Country Results
To compare the datasets, we calculate the Jaccard score of the Tweet IDs from
queryUSAi and queryATi . We then take the median, average, and standard deviation of
these Jaccard scores. These results are reported in the first row of Table 7. Here, we
see a very high average and a very low standard deviation between the Jaccard scores,
indicating that the results from these two queries are nearly identical. These results
indicate that no preference was given to the queries originating in the United States.
We are hopeful that researchers outside of the US will obtain similar results.
Between-Time Results
To compare the datasets, we fix the country C and calculate the Jaccard score
of the Tweet IDs from queryCi and queryCi+1. The results for the USA and Austria
queries are shown in rows 2 and 3 of Table 7, respectively. In the case of the USA,
we see even stronger results, with an extremely high average and an extremely low
standard deviation. Here, we can see that the overlapping times receive practically
the same dataset in all cases. In the case of the Austrian datasets, we see that there
is a wider distribution of Jaccard scores between query windows, however we continue
67
to see an extremely high mean, which gives us confidence in the coverage in these
results.
4.1.3 Discussion
In this chapter we ask how to find bias in the Streaming API without the need for
costly Firehose data. We test the representativity of another freely-available Twitter
data source, the Sample API. We find that overall the tweets that come through the
Sample API are a representative sample of the true activity on Twitter. We propose a
solution to harness this data source to find time periods where the Streaming API is
likely biased. Finally, we show that results obtained through the Streaming API for a
given time period see a significant amount of overlap between queries generated from
both the United States and from Austria, and between queries started at different
points in time.
One question that arises is how to integrate the results of our framework into an
individual’s research. One solution is to focus research efforts on time periods where
no (or little) bias is found in the dataset. Another potential solution is to purchase
Twitter data from a reseller such as Topsy19 or Gnip, but only paying for the biased
time periods. A third solution is to incorporate other forms of social media such as
blogs. This allows for a multifaceted view of the data, and can give the researcher more
depth in times where their Twitter data may be of question. One way to incorporate
these other views is to cross-reference users from Twitter with other social media
outlets, one such solution has been proposed in Zafarani and Liu 2013.
We have studied the feasibility of our method with the sparse signal that we get
19http://www.topsy.com
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from the Sample API. Overall, we find that this method can be used when the query
issued by the researcher receives a lot of attention from Twitter users. We also find
that this method is less useful when the query receives less data. One potential way
to alleviate this problem is to use other bootstrapping methods such that proposed
in Kirk and Stumpf 2009, which takes into account neighboring values to compute the
values. Future work will attempt to find bias in sparse data scenarios, and adapting
these methods to the speed and ephemerality of Twitter data.
4.2 Mitigating Social Data Collection Bias
In the previous chapter we discussed how we could identify bias in a previously
collected dataset. We showed how a statistical methodology could enable a researcher
to identify and remove bias in a dataset. However, this has the unsavory side effect of
asking a researcher to ignore certain parts of their dataset. This is not ideal for many
researchers who need to use as much data as possible in order to collect statistically
valid samples.
In this chapter we present a new approach for collecting social media data that
enables us to collect a representative sample from a social media site. This is based
upon reparameterizing the queries that we send to the APIs in order to maximize the
amount of data that we are able to obtain, and minimize the amount of sampling bias.
This is based upon our finding earlier that the amount of bias is a function of how the
sampling rate that Twitter imposes upon us.
Herein, we try to optimize the amount of data we get from the Streaming API. The
Twitter Streaming API uses a mechanism called “limit track” to inform the requester
of the number of tweets that were not delivered to them due to exceeding the 1% rate
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Figure 15: The General Idea behind the Splitting Mechanisms Proposed in This
Section. The Grey Areas Denote the Relevant Tweets That We Want to Collect. If
We Just Have One Crawler Tracking “#imwithher,” Then We Get the Entirety of the
Grey Area in the Circle but Lose the Grey “x”s. By Creating Additional Crawlers, We
Can Get a Greater Number of Those “x”s, in Turn Getting a Larger Sample of the
Data.
limit. The limit track data is provided periodically along with tweets delivered in a
particular stream. Unfortunately, if the limit track value provided by Twitter is not a
reliable measurement, then it becomes significantly more difficult to determine the
overall sample population, and, as a result, the level of bias in the sample remains
unknown.
4.2.1 Designing Novel Crawling Approaches
The main idea behind all of the methods in this chapter is that they are based
upon splitting the parameters into multiple crawls. By doing this we should be able
to get more tweets than with one crawler alone. This will be confirmed through
experimentation in a subsequent section. There are many ways to split the parameters
in order to achieve this task. We will propose two and investigate their usefulness.
The idea behind these approaches is that each individual crawler may be able to
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Figure 16: Overview of The Round Robin Splitting Approach.
give us more data than any one crawl. This is depicted in Figure 15, where we see
that we are able to capture more the grey (relevant) area with additional crawlers.
4.2.2 Round Robin Splitting
The round robin method of stream keyword splitting is an effective baseline for
other splitting methods as it is a straightforward method that requires very little
additional processing power. Sampling the amount of tweets gathered and missed
at each split level requires running one baseline stream that contains all selected
keywords as well as k additional streams that contain the keywords split between each
stream. While it is possible to sample all split levels simultaneously, the number of
required accounts for a test of this type is xk = k(k+1)2 where k is the number of split
levels and x is the number of accounts. Sampling all splits up to a split level of 7
would require 28 separate account which is unfeasible for our purposes. Additionally,
the processing power required to maintain the set of unique tweet IDs for each stream
becomes problematic very quickly. Alternatively, using a single baseline stream that
contains all keywords and comparing the results to each split level independently
requires a much lower number of accounts, xk = k + 1.
Both of the methods introduced in this chapter consist of a “priming stage.” The
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priming stage consists of a 15 minute run with a single crawler. This is done to get a
first set of tweets in order to make the splitting. All splits after that are performed on
the tweets collected in the previous iteration. This is shown on the left of Figure 16.
At the completion of the priming stage, the word pairs, from the most frequently
occurring to the least frequently occurring, are assigned to streams in a round robin
fashion. Each split level runs for 30 minutes before resetting all streams, including
the baseline stream, and beginning the next split level. Resetting the baseline stream
is key to analyzing each stream level in this method as it allows a comparison of the
difference between a single stream and multiple split streams over a given window of
time and thereby making it unnecessary to maintain all data for every level of split at
once.
The graph shown in Figure 17 show that we were able to eclipse the limit track
maximum by 12 splits at which point we were able to gather six times as many unique
tweets containing proper keywords than was possible with a single stream. Reaching
20 split levels nearly doubled the number of unique tweets gathered over the maximum
indicated by Twitter. Constructing round robin splits can be found in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Round Robin Splits Construction
input : graph G, num_clusters k
output : array of lists
for node v in G(V, E) do
keywordList += v
end
sortedList := Sort(keywordList by occurrence rate);
for word, index in sortedList do
listNum := index % k;
assign word to split list k
end
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Figure 17: Round Robin Splitting Based on Word Co-Occurrence Tends to Show a
Steady Rate of Gain as Additional Crawlers Are Added.
c1	
c2	
Figure 18: Overview of the Spectral Clustering Splitting Approach.
4.2.3 Spectral Splitting
Spectral clustering, an extension of K-Means clustering which performs “low-
dimension embedding” (Ng, Jordan, and Weiss 2001), directly leverages the word
occurrence graph. This clustering method allows us to define a number of clusters, K,
and the spectral clustering algorithm will incorporate the nuances of the similarity
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Figure 19: The Results of Spectral Clustering Show an Increase in the Overall Sample
Coverage. However, the Clustering Creates Unbalanced Splits Where One Stream,
While Still a Good Cluster, May Contain Significantly More Words Than Others.
The Lack of Balance Manifests through Instability in the Rate of Gain from Each
Additional Crawler.
between the items in order to improve cluster results. Like most clustering algorithms,
spectral clustering does not make any guarantee on the size of each cluster.
This approach is based upon performing a spectral clustering of the keyword
co-occurrence graph, as shown in Figure 18. The main idea behind this method is that
we want to reduce the redundancy of the data collected by each crawler. As intuition,
imagine if after we performed a split, each cluster retrieved exactly the same data.
That would not be beneficial as we are not gaining any new data and not learning
anything new about the core set of hashtags we wish to study. Thus, to improve the
performance of our approach we want each cluster to get as much unique data as
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Figure 20: Results of Different Methodologies at the 3-Split Level.
possible. By grouping keywords that tend to occur together in clusters, we are likely
to minimize the redundancy of the data that each cluster provides.
The approach is simple. First, we use the “priming step,” explained above, to get
a set of tweets. Next, we build a word-word co-occurrence graph based upon how the
co-occur in tweets. This is a weighted graph where nodes are words, and edges are
the number of times that the pair of words co-occur in the corpus of tweets. Next,
we run spectral clustering on this graph to yield a series of clusters. These clusters
become the parameters for the crawl in the next iteration of the crawler.
The results of this approach can be seen in Figure 19. Clustering based on word
occurrence quickly passes the Twitter limit with only 6 streams active but shortly
thereafter struggles to gain much ground. Wild fluctuation can be observed between
each split level and while there is overall growth it is possible to gather a smaller
sample with a larger split level. Such inconsistencies were not observed in Figure
17 further indicating how detrimental sensitivity to cluster size is when considering
methods for gathering tweet samples. Spectral clustering based splits can be found in
Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2: Process for Constructing Spectral Clustering Splits.
input : graph G, num_clusters k
output : array of lists
matrix A := [][];
for node v in G(V, E, W) do
wordIDs[v] := unique ID
end
/* create affinity matrix for spectral clustering */
for word pair (v1,v2) in G(V, E, W) do
Construct symmetric matrix A for all words such that v1,v2 := E.weight;
end
labels := the result of Spectral Clustering with k clusters and the matrix A;
for label, cluster in labels do
splitLists[cluster].append(label)
end
Table 8: Sample Coverage by Approach. “1-Split” Is the Amount of Data That We
Would Get with No Splitting Approach.
1-split 2-split 3-split 4-split
Round Robin 19.02% 50.54% 82.58% 64.34%
Spectral Clustering 19.02% 28.95% 78.63% 82.08%
4.2.4 Performance of Splitting Approaches
We have proposed two methods for splitting keywords in social media data queries
and shown preliminary results for how they perform on Twitter. We will now compare
these methodologies in order to show how they perform side-by-side.
A comparison of each splitting method can be seen in Figure 20. These results are
the average coverage rates related to the total sample size estimated from the limit
track over 20 trials. Though the Twitter limit track is not a perfect indicator of the
total population of data available from a complete set, it is used in this comparison as
a relative measure as opposed to an absolute. Given additional crawlers, it is very
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likely that the limit track would again be eclipsed. Each splitting method was able to
produce a sample significantly closer to the total population as estimated by Twitter
and always many times larger than a single stream.
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Chapter 5
BIAS FROM MALICIOUS ACTORS
Bias does not originate purely from data collection. There are many actors in the
real world that attempt to skew the contents of social media. This is done to make
certain ideas, products, or candidates appear to be more popular than they truly may
be. The ways in which they inject this bias into social media data varies. In this
chapter we will introduce three such methods and ways to detect them. First, we will
introduce bots. Bots are automated accounts that work together at a large scale to
skew the content of a site in their favor. By automatically posting a large number of
social media messages, they can easily make their message seem more prominent than
it actually is. Bots generally work together, with thousands of millions of accounts
working in tandem to promote a message.20 However, the decisions that a social
media site makes when distributing data can enable them to further promote their
messages. In this chapter we will discuss how bots can take advantage of Twitter’s
data distribution mechanisms to promote their messaging. Finally, not all users that
attempt to skew the perceptions of social media users are bots. Many are sophisticated
users who are trained to promote pointed content online. We will investigate one
specific case of these users, “shills,” and discuss possible ways to detect them.
Portions of this chapter have been published at WWW 2016 (Morstatter, Dani, et al. 2016) and
ASONAM 2016 (Morstatter, Wu, et al. 2016).
20https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/12/twitter-bots-drown-out-anti-kremlin-tweets/
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5.1 Identifying Bots: The Importance of Recall
Social media is an important part of every day life. With billions of users producing
and consuming information every day, it is a natural extension that people turn to this
medium to read and disseminate news. With so many people turning to social media,
malicious users like bots have begun using these sites to sway the discussion (Ratkiewicz,
Conover, Meiss, Goncalves, Patil, et al. 2011; Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss, Goncalves,
Flammini, et al. 2011; Thomas, Grier, and Paxson 2012). Bots, social media accounts
that are controlled by software, have risen to prominence on social media. Bots cause
users to lose trust that social media platforms can deliver news honestly, as they
become suspicious that the stories they see at the top of their feeds were “pushed”
there by manipulative bots. Furthermore, bots impinge the work researchers perform
on social media as they can cause researchers to draw false conclusions about the
populations under study. Researchers wish to understand human behavior through
the lens of social media (Mejova, Weber, and Macy 2015), and this is often impinged
by the wealth of content pollution created by automated social media accounts.
Bot detection is an important task in social media. Twitter, a popular social media
platform, is plagued by automated accounts. One study has estimated that over half
of the accounts on Twitter are not human21. More conservative studies estimate that
the number of bots on Twitter lie somewhere between 5-9% of the overall population22.
These bots, generate 24% of the tweets produced on Twitter23. While some bots
21http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/03/21/new-report-spotlights-twitters-retention-problem/
22http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/1-10-twitter-accounts-fake-say-researchers-2D11655362
23https://sysomos.com/inside-twitter/most-active-twitter-user-data
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innocuously tweet the time of day or a record of historical events, the ones we detect
in this study seek to actively sway the discussion on social media by promoting certain
trends and retweeting particular users. These bots are considered malicious as they
try to perturb the discussion on social media, swaying the discussion to the topics of
their choosing by falsely amplifying the size of a topic or keyword.
Bots are not just a danger to the users of social media, but also to those that study
it. By coordinating massive tweeting campaigns of particular hashtags, bots have
been able to influence measures on Twitter, including the trending topics (Ratkiewicz,
Conover, Meiss, Goncalves, Flammini, et al. 2011). This manipulation of Twitter also
bleeds across into the analysis that is done on this particular platform. Bots can also
influence statistics performed on Twitter data, such as the top hashtags and the most
important users in the data. This means that bots not only have the potential to
damage the active conversation on social media, but they can also cause additional
destruction by harming the quality of the work done by researchers studying social
media. Clearly, there is a need for us to remove bots from social media both for the
benefit of users and researchers.
Current approaches to bot detection focus on precision (Lee and Kim 2014;
Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss, Goncalves, Flammini, et al. 2011; Xie et al. 2008).
Optimizing precision can be useful as it helps to avoid the possibility of a real user
being deleted from the site, which may anger other real users or cause them to leave
the site. However, this is one extreme. An algorithm that only considers precision will
have many false-negatives, as it will only predict the most acute examples as bots,
leaving many bots undetected. This is not ideal from a research perspective, where we
wish to study human behavior on social media. Thus, we want to include recall as the
objective of our bot detection model. However, this is another extreme. The major
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concern with optimizing recall is that it is trivial to achieve a perfect score: simply
marking every user as a bot will yield a recall of 100%. Thus, we propose to study
the balance between these measures. While our model focuses on recall, we measure
its performance using the F1 score.
We propose a model that can detect bots on social media with a focus on recall.
We evaluate by taking into account both precision and recall to strike the balance
between these important evaluation measures. In this way, we show that our method
can help to remove the most bots, while simultaneously keeping the precision relatively
high. By applying BoostOR, researchers can remove more bots from their social media
dataset and focus on the messages produced by real users.
5.1.1 Bot Definition
A bot is any automated account in an online social network. This definition differs
slightly from the one found in Boshmaf et al. 2011 and Boshmaf et al. 2013 as they
differentiate social bots from self-declared and spambots although socialbots and
spambots may have the same structure and purpose.
5.1.2 Problem Statement
Given a set of all of the users in a dataset, U , and a set of labeled bots b ⊂ U ,
identify a set of users u ⊂ U that maximizes the function:
F1(u, b) = 2
PR
P +R
(5.1)
where P = |u∩b||u| is the precision of the model, and R =
|u∩b|
|b| is the recall.
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The main contributions of this section are as follows:
• We collect two bot datasets using state-of-the-art collection techniques, and test
two labeling techniques. We publish this data to allow for reproducibility and
encourage comparison with future work.
• We build a model that detects bots on Twitter with an emphasis on the F1
measure, which considers recall as well as precision. We compare this model to
existing approaches for bot detection and find that the model achieves superior
performance in this task, yielding high recall with only a minor loss in precision,
which contributes to it achieving the best F1 score in all algorithms we studied.
5.1.3 Labeled Datasets for Bot Detection
Obtaining a social bot dataset can be difficult due to the challenge in obtaining
definitive ground truth. While many approaches have been employed to obtain ground
truth, we use two main approaches to label social media users as bots or humans: 1)
observing whether the social media platform suspends these users and treating these
suspended users as bots, and 2) creating “honeypot” bot accounts that to lure bots
into following them, and then labeling these followers as bots.
We create two datasets to test the bot detection approaches. The labels for each
dataset are obtained using different labeling approaches. Here, we enumerate the two
datasets used in this study, along with describing the bot labeling approach24.
24Both datasets can be obtained from the following link: http://www.public.asu.edu/ fmor-
stat/ASONAM_data.zip.
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Table 9: Statistics of the Data Used for Bot Detection.
Property Libya Arabic Honeypot
Tweets 1,150,192 504,679
Retweets 576,167 220,500
Unique Users 94,535 6,285
Labeling Approach Suspended Accts Honeypots
Bot Ratio 7.5% 49.0%
Arab Spring in Libya
From February 3rd, 2011 to February 21st, 2013, we collected Twitter data per-
taining to Arab Spring activity in Libya. The data was collected from Twitter’s
Streaming API25, a service which provides a stream of tweets matching a query (Ku-
mar, Morstatter, and Liu 2014). The query we used to collect this data consisted of the
following keywords: #libya, #gaddafi, #benghazi, #brega, #misrata, #nalut,
#nafusa, #rhaibat, as well as a geographic bounding box around Libya26. Statistics
on the dataset are shown in Table 19.
We obtained labels of whether a user is a bot or human by observing how Twitter
handled these users. In February of 2015, we crawled each user in the dataset and
observed the status of his Twitter account. We observed the user’s account status via
the statuses/user_timeline API endpoint27. The status can take on one of three
values:
1. Active: A user whose account is still open and available on the site.
25https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/reference/post/statuses/filter
26Southwest Lng/Lat: 23.4/10.0; Northeast Lng/Lat: 33.0,25.0.
27https://dev.twitter.com/rest/reference/get/statuses/user_timeline
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2. Deleted: A user whose account has been deleted. A user can be deleted by
violating Twitter’s policies. This is considered a permanent ban.
3. Suspended: A user whose account has been suspended for violating Twitter’s
policies. This is considered a temporary ban, where the user can petition Twitter
to have his account reinstated.
These labels were obtained by using Twitter’s APIs to crawl the dataset and inspecting
the response code from the API. Through this process we discovered that 92.5% of
the users are active, 4.7% are deleted, and 2.8% are suspended. Because deleted and
suspended have similar meanings, we consider both labels as a bot.
At first glance, we notice that the fraction of users identified as bots by this labeling
technique is around 7.5%. This distribution gives a very conservative estimate of the
number of bots on Twitter. This is a side effect of an industry approach which focuses
purely on precision in order to avoid accidentally deleting some real users. We realize
that this is not representative of the true distribution of bots on the site (Wei et al.
2015), and that many bots may have been overlooked by Twitter. With this in mind,
we introduce our next dataset which focuses on detecting bots in the wild through
honeypots which tweet specific content.
Arabic Honeypot Dataset
This dataset consists of bots tweeting messages in Arabic. To collect this dataset,
we construct a honeypot network. This network consists of 9 accounts controlled
automatically by a single controller. Each account tweets messages containing Arabic
phrases identified by a subject matter expert pertaining to a specific group of people.
Each account also randomly follows other honeypots in our network. Since bots have
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a lower chance of forming social ties (Thomas et al. 2011), we perform this random
following process to lower the chance that our accounts are deleted by Twitter’s
automatic account removal algorithm. Additionally, each honeypot can randomly
retweet one of the other honeypots it follows in order to give that honeypot prominence
on the network and lower its probability of being deleted due to Twitter’s policies.
All of the bots in our honeypot dataset behave identically, as dictated by the
controller. Each bot collects tweets using the selected Arabic phrases from Twitter’s
Streaming API. At random time intervals, the bot either copies the tweet, passing it
off as its own, or retweets it from the user who originally posted it. The full logic for
the honeypot controller is shown in Algorithm 3. Using a network of 9 honeypots,
we consider all followers of our honeypots to be bots: due to the way our honeypots
behave, no normal user would follow them (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee 2011). With this
approach we collected 3,602 active bot accounts who followed one of our honeypot
accounts.
While the honeypot method yields a set of bot accounts, it does not give us a
set of real users. This is because we only look at the bot followers to our honeypots,
and we do not have ground truth labels for real users. In order to test our model, we
need to collect a set of real users to use as negative training instances. To do this,
we manually inspected a seed set of 10 users who also tweeted the same phrases. We
did not extract verified accounts as these users are not normal users. They are often
controlled by public relations firms and tweet on specific topics. We did this to ensure
that the algorithm we train finds bot patterns in the text, and does not simply learn
the difference in language distributions. Moving forward with the assumption that
real users do not follow malicious bots, we use 1-link snowball sampling to collect
their immediate network. We ensured that each user in the sample had fewer than
85
Algorithm 3: Logic for Honeypot Controller. The Controller Manages the
Honeypot Accounts Used to Collect Bots in the Wild. All Randomly-Generated
Numbers Mentioned in the Pseudocode Are Generated Uniformly at Random.
while True do
Randomly choose one honeypot, h;
r ←− random number ∈ [1, 10];
if r = 1 then
h retweets the most recent tweet from another randomly-selected
honeypot;
end
else
Sample tweets from Twitter Streaming API for 20 seconds, filtering
based on Arabic phrases, call sample set S;
r ←− random number ∈ [1, 10];
s←− randomly-selected tweet from S;
if r < 3 then
h retweets s;
end
else
h copies s and tweets it word-for-word;
end
end
Wait 10 seconds;
end
1,000 followers to make sure that we did not collect any celebrities (Zafarani, Abbasi,
and Liu 2014). We also inspected each user in the sample to ensure that he tweeted
one of the phrases at some point in his last 200 tweets. This approach yielded 3,107
real-world accounts, which helped us to maintain the same class distribution reported
in other approaches (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee 2011).
5.1.4 Bot Detection Approaches
We propose a model for bot detection which considers recall in its formulation. As
baselines we consider popular heuristics used to detect bot accounts. We also consider
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a model based upon topic modeling. In this section we present the formulation for all
of the bot-detection approaches we study. We begin by introducing the heuristics and
baselines considered, and continue to introduce our model, BoostOR.
Heuristics
Here we introduce a set of heuristics that are used to differentiate bot from non-bot
users in social media. These heuristics are based upon state-of-the-art studies in bot
detection on social media.
Fraction of Retweets
This measures the number of times the user published a retweet divided by the number
of tweets the user has published, calculated as:
HeuristicRetweet(u) =
|{x|x ∈ tweetsu, x is retweet}|
|tweetsu| . (5.2)
Whether a tweet is a retweet is determined by looking at the “retweeted_status”
field of the tweet’s data when returned through the API. If the field contains tweet
information, we consider it to be a retweet. This measure was introduced in Ratkiewicz,
Conover, Meiss, Goncalves, Flammini, et al. 2011, and hypothesizes that bots are
unable to produce original content, so they rely on the retweet feature in Twitter in
order to establish their presence.
Average Tweet Length
A tweet’s text is limited to 140 characters, but it is possible that bots post fewer than
that as they could just be promoting a URL or a hashtag (Lee and Kim 2014). To
account for this, we introduce this heuristic which measures the average length of the
user’s tweets. It is the sum of the characters in all of the tweets the user has published
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divided by the number of tweets the user has published, formally:
HeuristicLength(u) =
∑|tweetsu|
i |tweetsui |
|tweetsu| , (5.3)
where |tweetsui | is the length of user u’s i-th tweet, measured by the number of
characters in the tweet.
Fraction of URLs
This measures the number of times the user published a tweet containing a URL
divided by the number of tweets the user has published, formally:
HeuristicURL(u) =
|{x|x ∈ tweetsu, x contains URL}|
|tweetsu| . (5.4)
Whether a tweet contains a URL is determined by looking at the “entities” field of the
tweet returned by Twitter’s API. This measure has been studied previously (Ratkiewicz,
Conover, Meiss, Goncalves, Patil, et al. 2011; Xie et al. 2008), and hypothesizes that
bots are motivated to persuade real users into visiting external sites operated by their
controller. In this way, this heuristic traps bots that are trying to promote URLs in
their tweets.
Average Time Between Tweets
It has been discovered that many bots tweet in a “bursty” nature (Lee and Kim 2014;
Xie et al. 2008), publishing many of their tweets within a short amount of time. This
behavior is measured as:
HeuristicT ime(u) =
1
|tweetsu| − 1
N∑
i=2
(ti − ti−1), (5.5)
where ti is the time stamp of the i-th tweet in u’s timeline, sorted chronologically in
ascending order (i.e. ti ≥ ti−1).
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Topic Modeling
Bot accounts are created by malicious users to spread misinformation through
their tweets. Thus, their content can be a strong indicator to expose such potential
compromised accounts. The problem with using content for bot detection is that
the raw text features are of high dimensionality and sparse, causing the “Curse of
Dimensionality”. Inspired by the recent advances of topic modeling, we adopt latent
Dirichlet allocation (LDA) to obtain a topic representation of each user. Since the raw
features (words) can be viewed as being generated by a mixture of topics, and the bots
are naturally more interested in certain topics, denoting each user as a distribution
over different topics may help the learning process better identify them from regular
accounts.
LDA is an unsupervised and probabilistic model that has been proven useful for
extracting latent semantics of documents. The principle idea behind LDA is that it
treats each document as a distribution over topics, and each topic as a distribution
over the vocabulary in the dataset. LDA requires one parameter28, K, the number of
topics in the corpus. From here, LDA learns two matrices:
1. Φ: the Topic×Word matrix. Each topic in LDA, Φi, is a probability distribution
over the entire vocabulary in the corpus. Thus, Φji is the probability of word j
occurring in topic i.
2. Θ: the Document × Topic matrix. Since each document is modeled as a
distribution over topics, this each row, Θi, contains the document’s distribution
over all of the topics learned by LDA.
28We use the default hyperparameter value of α = 1K , and β =
1
K .
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Figure 21: Illustration of the Models.
In this approach, we treat the user as a document. Each user’s document consists
of the concatenation of all of the content of his tweets. We feed these documents
into LDA with K = 200, obtaining Φ and Θ values for the corpus29. Since the Θ
matrix contains the affinity for each user to each topic, we can treat these as features
to be fed into a classifier. We build an SVM classifier by directly using Θ as the
Instance× Feature matrix, where the instances are users and the features are their
affinities for the latent dimensions discovered by LDA.
Supervised Model for Bot Identification
In this section, we will introduce how we optimize F1, which includes both precision
and recall, when exposing bots. Since bots are usually generated by different parties
for different purposes, the discriminant characteristics of bots from different groups
are unrelated. Such heterogeneity of bots makes it challenging to come up with a
classifier. To this end, we formulate the problem as a boosting task. Boosting methods
aim to achieve an optimal classifier through ensembling weak classifiers, which are
29We will discuss our selection of K in the experiments section.
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more proper for this problem since different weak classifiers will focus on different
bots.
First, we investigate whether boosting algorithms are directly applicable for bot
detection. For generality, we selected AdaBoost for optimization. AdaBoost trains one
weak classifier based on all training examples every iteration. In each iteration, the
misclassified examples in the previous round are higher weighted in the next round.
The final classifier is the weighted ensemble of all weak classifiers. Therefore, the key
issues are how the weight are determined for different weak classifiers and training
examples. Here we use α to denote classifier weight, the weight of classifier t can be
calculated as follows:
αt = −1
2
ln(βt), (5.6)
where βt denotes the extent of the base learner deviates from the optimal solution. βt
can be directly calculated with training error  as follows:
βt =
t
1− t . (5.7)
As shown in Eq. 5.8, αt is greater than zero if t is less than 50%; while αt is less
than zero if t is greater than 50%. t can be calculated through Eq. 5.8.
t =
1∑m
i=1Dt(i)
m∑
i=1
Dt(i)1(hi(vi) 6= yi), (5.8)
where the function 1(·) equals one when the condition holds, and zero otherwise.
The second issue is to determine the weight of each training instance at each
iteration. The instance weight is regulated depending on whether it is correctly
classified in the previous round and the performance of the weak learner. As denoted
in Eq. 5.9, when the weak learner’s error rate is less than 50%, weights of misclassified
users will increase while those of the rest decrease.
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Dt+1(i) =
Dt(i)exp(−αtyiht(vi))
Zt
(5.9)
Zt =
m∑
i=1
Dt(i)exp(−αtyiht(vi)).
The algorithm of AdaBoost for bot detection is illustrated in Algorithm 4. Note that
m is the number of all users and k is the number of features. Since LDA is adopted to
represent the user, here each user vector vi can be viewed as a probability distribution
over k topics. The user labels are denoted by Y = {y1, . . . , ym} ∈ {−1, 1}m×1, where
yi = 1 means that user i is a bot.
Algorithm 4: AdaBoost for Bot Detection
Input: The user-feature matrix V ∈ Rm×k,
the user-label matrix Y ∈ {−1, 1}m×1 and a weak learner h : V→ Y
the initial user weight vector D1 = (D1(1), . . . ,D1(m))
the maximum number of iterations maxiter.
Output: The ensemble classifier H(v) = sign(
∑T
t=1 αtht(v))
For t = 1, . . . , maxiter
Train weak learner using instance weight Dt ;
Get the trained classifier ht : V→ Y and training error t as Eq. 5.8;
Calculate the weight αt ∈ R for ht as Eq. 5.6;
Update user weight as Eq. 5.9;
until Convergence.
Since we aim to achieve a classifier which is sensitive to bots, we investigate how
AdaBoost could be adapted for optimizing recall. As mentioned before, the weight of
bots may be reduced if they are correctly classified. The reduction of weight leads
subsequent weak classifiers to less focus on these bots, which is unfavourable. Therefore,
we next investigate how the sensitivity to bots can be kept through regulating the
weights of training instances. An intuitive solution is to avoid reducing weights of
bots, which can be formulated as follows:
Dt+1(i) = Dt(i)β
−yi|hi(vi−yi)|. (5.10)
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As shown in Eq. 5.10, if a regular user is predicted to be a bot, the corresponding
weight will be multiplied by β|hi(vi−yi)| ∈ (0, 1], while the mislabeled bots still gain
more weights. The loss between prediction and ground truth spans between the range
of [0, 1], and an exponential form ensemble predictor is adopted. This means that the
training error after T iterations is bounded. We name the new boosting algorithm as
Boosting through Optimizing Recall (BoostOR). The detailed algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 4. Figure 21a illustrates how the example weight is updated in AdaBoost
model. The mislabeled instances will gain a larger weight in the second round of
iteration. While in BoostOR, the weight change depends on the labels of the user. If
a bot is wrongly predicted, its weight is enlarged. mislabeled regular users are more
often ignored.
Since the weight of regular users are reduced instead of removed, trivial solutions
will not be easily achieved in real world data, where bots are the minority group. In
next section, we empirically prove this with two real world Twitter datasets.
Algorithm 5: BoostOR for Bot Detection
Input: The user-feature matrix V ∈ Rm×k,
the user-label matrix Y ∈ {1,−1}m×1 and a weak learner h : v→ y
the initial user weight vector D1 = (D1(1), . . . ,D1(m))
the maximum number of iterations maxiter.
Output: The ensemble classifier H(v) = sign(Πmaxiteri=1 (β
−hi(v)
i − β−
1
2
i )
For t = 1, . . . , maxiter
Train weak learner using instance weight Dt ;
Get the trained classifier ht : V→ Y and training error t as Eq. 5.8;
Calculate the weight αt ∈ R for ht as Eq. 5.6;
Update user weight as Eq. 5.10;
until Convergence.
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Figure 22: Performance of BoostOR Varying Number of Topics.
5.1.5 Experimental Results
In this section we empirically investigate the performance of BoostOR with respect
the ability to maximize the F1 score on bot detection. We perform two experiments:
first to show the performance of different algorithms, and second to show how the
parameters used in building the AdaBoost and BoostOR models can influence the
results of these methods.
Bot Classification
We apply each heuristic, as well as AdaBoost and BoostOR to both the Libya
dataset, shown in Table 12, and the Arabic Honeypot dataset, shown in Table 13.
We find that both AdaBoost and BoostOR outperform the heuristics, with BoostOR
performing the best on both datasets. Interestingly, we find that SVM underperforms,
achieving a worse result than the heuristics when optimizing the F1 score.
One thing to note about the heuristics is that they conform to the class distribution.
That is, when they achieve their maximum performance they are simply always
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Table 10: HeuristicT ime Measure on the Arabic Honeypot Dataset.
Prediction
Bot Human
Tr
ut
h Bot 49.9% 50%
Human 0% 0.1%
Table 11: BoostOR Measure on the Arabic Honeypot Dataset.
Prediction
Bot Human
Tr
ut
h Bot 42.8% 7.7%
Human 14.8% 34.7%
predicting the user is a bot. In other words, the results of heuristic measures indicate
that we should delete our entire dataset for both datasets. While this yields what
seem to be competitive results, the implication of this approach is not reasonable.
While the F1 score is useful to measure the performance, we need to dig deeper to
understand the implication of these results.
To illustrate the difference in performance between the heuristics and our proposed
model, we show a confusion matrix of the best-performing heuristic, HeuristicT ime,
in Table 10 and a confusion matrix of BoostOR in Table 11 on the Arabic Honeypot
dataset. First, we notice that the heuristic never misclassifies as a human as a bot.
This is in line with the goals of the industry. However, we see in the BoostOR results
in Table 11 that we achieve superior performance by lowering the false-negative rate
of the model, which is in line with the goals of the researcher.
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Table 12: The Precision, Recall and F1 Measure of Different Models on Libya Dataset.
Method Precision Recall F1
HeuristicURL 6.74% 65.12% 12.21%
HeuristicRetweet% 7.73% 53.63% 13.51%
HeuristicLength 7.74% 53.63% 13.51%
HeuristicT ime 7.48% 99.89% 13.91%
SVM 29.24% 8.78% 13.53%
AdaBoost 75.25% 7.48% 13.61%
BoostOR 75.41% 8.14% 14.69%
Table 13: The Precision, Recall and F1 Measure of Different Models on Honeypot
Dataset.
Method Precision Recall F1
HeuristicURL 49.69% 96.39% 65.58%
HeuristicRetweet% 50.05% 99.33% 66.56%
HeuristicLength 50.00% 99.82% 66.63%
HeuristicT ime 49.99% 99.96% 66.65%
SVM 62.41% 62.52% 62.47%
AdaBoost 79.76% 72.41% 75.91%
BoostOR 71.42% 82.48% 76.55%
Sensitivity of Topic Modeling
In previous experiments, the number of topics, K, of LDA is set as 200 for all
methods. In this section, we study how the number of topics will influence the
performance of the proposed model, BoostOR. The change of precision, recall and F1
score as a function ofK is illustrated in Figure 22. On both datasets, the dimensionality
spans from 50 to 500 and the variations of performance are observed.
As shown in the figures, the best performance is achieved when there are around
200 topics. When K deviates from the optimal value of 200, no matter increasing or
decreasing, the performance decreases. Too many topics enable some redundant and
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meaningless topics to exist, while some important topics may be neglected if the K is
too small.
5.1.6 Discussion
In this chapter we explore the problem of finding bots on social media. We begin
by collecting two datasets, each with different labeling mechanisms. Then we continue
to propose a bot detection method that optimizes the F1 score of the model, which
considers recall in addition to precision.
The datasets we use to test this method were labeled through different processes.
The first dataset we consider is labeled through using Twitter’s labeling processes
of active/suspended/deleted users. The second dataset was obtained by building a
honeypot network and collecting the users who follow our honeypot accounts. These
datasets encompass different topics and were labeled using two different methods,
which make them ideal for testing both the performance and generalizability of our
model.
Next, we propose to optimize the F1 score of the bot detection problem through
boosting a basic learner. In order to recall more bots from the dataset, the proposed
BoostOR focuses more on the mislabeled bots and downweights mislabeled regular
users. The theoretical analysis shows that the optimization can be done efficiently.
Experimental results on two real world datasets show that our model outperforms
the state-of-the-art bot detection techniques as well as heuristics which are often
considered for this problem.
Future work seeks to further improve the recall of the bot detection task. Existing
approaches which focus on precision could potentially be modified to improve recall.
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We wish to exploit the sparsity of text in order to better separate bots from normal
users. Additionally, we will continue to refine the process for collecting labeled social
media datasets.
5.2 Tampering Bias in Social Data Streams
Social media has become a very active research area in recent years. One limiting
factor for many researchers is the amount of data they are able to collect. Many social
media sites strictly limit or outright forbid the collection of data on their sites for
research purposes. One major social media site, Twitter, stands out among these sites
for its willingness to share data with researchers. Twitter does this mainly through
its real-time feeds, called the “Streaming” APIs. There are three main APIs that
researchers can access directly: 1) the “Filter API”, which gives the user a directed
sample based on the input of the user, 2) the “Sample API” which returns a random
1% sample of all public tweets generated on Twitter, and 3) the “Firehose” which yields
100% of all public tweets. While the Firehose seems like the obvious monetary cost of
using this API as well as the server requirements for hosting the data prevent most
researchers from being able to use this option. The Filter API and the Sample API can
be used by researchers worldwide to download tweets in real-time, collecting at most
1% of all of Twitter’s public statuses, or “tweets” completely free of charge (Morstatter
et al. 2013).
The Filter API and the Sample API are appealing to researchers, and it is important
that researchers understand the underlying mechanisms of these APIs so that they
can have confidence in the data collected through them. Biases introduced in the
data collection process can propagate to the research results. For instance, bias has
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been found in Twitter’s Filter API. By comparing the results of a Firehose crawl with
a Filter API crawl, the authors of one study (Morstatter et al. 2013) discover that
bias in the way tweets are sampled yields completely different statistics, e.g. the top
hashtags in the data and the topics in the text.
While evidence of bias has been found in the Filter API, studies on the Sample
API have been largely positive, with indications that this data outlet is unbiased.
By empirically studying the data, one study (Morstatter, Pfeffer, and Liu 2014)
found that the results were not statistically significantly different than the results
of the Firehose. Another study (Kergl, Roedler, and Seeber 2014) discovered the
underlying mechanisms behind how Twitter samples the data in the Sample API.
First, they show the different components that make up the identification number (ID)
for each and every individual tweet. A portion of this ID contains the millisecond-level
timestamp when the ID was generated. The authors find that the Sample API selects
the tweets based on this timestamp, with any tweet whose ID was generated in the
millisecond range of [657, 666] to be selected by the Sample API. Twitter, assuming
that the millisecond-level information of the ID’s timestamp is random, chooses this
mechanism to distribute their tweets. This sampling mechanism seems reasonable.
Humans don’t have millisecond-level control over the tweet’s timestamp. The muscle
movements to click a mouse or tap a phone screen combined with the network delay
make the timestamp nearly impossible for a human to predict at the millisecond-level
granularity.
Unfortunately, many of the users of Twitter are not humans, but bots: accounts
controlled by computers. Estimates of the number of bots on Twitter range from
5-9% (Elder 2013). Many of these bots have malicious intent: using their ability to
generate massive amounts of noise to try to skew statistics of the data (e.g. sentiment
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towards particular topics, top keywords). Bots have the ability to control the exact
time their tweets are posted, allowing them to control (to a certain extent) the time
that Twitter receives their tweet. If bots are able to control if their tweets appear in
the Sample API, it could affect the integrity of this stream: bots could modify the
statistics of this data stream, affecting both research and applications that depend on
this stream.
In this chapter we evaluate two questions: 1) “can the millisecond-level information
of the timestamps associated with tweet IDs be anticipated?”, and 2) “can we leverage
this to build software which generates tweets that have a greater chance of being
included in Twitter’s Sample API?”
5.2.1 Anticipating the Sample API
Here we investigate whether the tweet ID’s millisecond-level timestamp information
can be predicted. In this first experiment we see how the millisecond-level information
of the tweet ID corresponds to the millisecond at which the tweet was sent. To do
this, we send tweets at each whole millisecond in the range [0, 990] in intervals of 10.
For each tweet we send, we observe the millisecond-level information of the tweet’s ID.
We extract this using the process outlined in Kergl, Roedler, and Seeber 2014, which
identifies specific bits in the binary representation of the ID that contain this info.
We repeat this experiment 6 times, and plot the results in Figure 23. We observe a
strong linear relationship between the time the tweet is sent and the millisecond ID
of the tweet ID. Furthermore, we find that the millisecond delta is consistent with
an average delta of 171ms. Using this information we devise an approach that can
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generate tweets with a greater probability of landing in the Sample API in the next
section.
5.2.2 Manipulating the Sample API
In the previous section we showed empirically that the millisecond-level timestamp
information of a tweet ID is a function of the time the tweet is posted. Using this
insight, we design an algorithm that adaptively adjusts the millisecond lag in order
to maximize the amount of tweets that appear in the Sample API. The pseudocode
for this algorithm is shown in Algorithm 6. The essence of this algorithm is that it
adaptively measures the network lag between when the tweet is sent and when the
tweet is received by Twitter, measured by the ID of the tweet. We use a moving
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average of the last w tweets to estimate the lag. Details on how to extract i from the
tweet ID can be found in Kergl, Roedler, and Seeber 2014.
To measure the effectiveness of our algorithm, and by extension the possibility to
bias the Sample API, we conduct 5 trial runs. In each experiment we produce 100
tweets. We use w = 3 in our experiments. We set m = 661 as it is the midpoint of
[657, 666] and should give us the greatest chance of hitting the window where the
Sample API selects its tweets. Also, we set δˆinit = 491 as it is the expected delta
from 661 as we discovered in the previous section. We achieve 82± 9% coverage,
contrasted with 1± 0% coverage when tweets are produced under normal conditions.
Algorithm 6: Maximize the Probability of a Post Being Selected by the Sample
API. 1(·) Is the Indicator Function.
Data: w: window size; m: target millisecond; δˆinit: initial delta
h← empty list;
target← m− δˆinit;
while true do
wait until the target-th millisecond of the next second;
post a tweet, t;
c← current time in milliseconds;
i← time in milliseconds from tweet t’s ID;
append i− c to the end of h;
δˆ ← 1
w
∑|h|
k=|h|−w h[k] mod 1000;
target← 1000 · 1(m− δˆ < 0) +m− δˆ;
end
5.2.3 Discussion
Twitter’s Sample API is a popular tool among researchers in the area of social
media mining. The results of this chapter show that by timing the creation time of
tweets, bots and spammers can have a large impact on the information that is provided
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through the Sample API, effectively injecting bias into this data outlet. This is a
major problem for users who wish to ensure that their data is a representative sample
of the real activity on Twitter. The approach presented in this chapter is intended
to give researchers an understanding that despite recent findings that say that the
Sample API is unbiased, results should be taken with care when this data outlet is
used in analysis. Furthermore, social media sites can use these results to improve the
design of their APIs. API designers can surpass this issue by adding random bits to
the timestamp portion of the ID, or by pre-generating IDs before distributing them.
5.3 Bias from Sophisticated Actors: The Case of Shills
There is ample evidence to suggest that social media acts as a powerful tool
for campaigns. In the realm of politics, social media can spread political informa-
tion (Tufekci and Wilson 2012), build political brands (Harfoush 2009), energize
supporters (Juris 2012), and to reach and persuade potential voters (DiGrazia et al.
2013; Tumasjan et al. 2010). Politicians and political activists have employed many
different social media techniques to spread their message. Most recently, both major
parties’ presidential campaigns used social media to spread information as well as to
lambaste political opponents. What these techniques all have in common is that they
are overt, where users of a social media site know who the political players are and
can watch and contribute as their dialogue and messaging plays out online.
We live in an era where opinion manipulation is rampant online. There are many
covert groups that attempt to sway the opinion of real people by manipulating and
misrepresenting facts in order to make one side of a debate look more prominent than
it actually is. There are many ways for this to manifest online. One is through the
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presence of bots, automated accounts who push certain hashtags or opinions to the
top of trending lists (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee 2011; Chu et al. 2010). Because these
accounts are automated, they do not contain rich original text like normal users, a
weakness that can be leveraged to detect them in the real world. Another covert
strategy is the deployment of “crowdturfers” (Lee, Tamilarasan, and Caverlee 2013).
These are real people who are hired en masse by campaigns to generate text on their
behalf. Because they are not experts on the topic they discuss, they can often be
detected due to their novice nature (Ott, Cardie, and J. T. Hancock 2013). Both
of these covert types of users can quickly spread opinions and propaganda quickly
throughout a network.
Recently, a covert technique has gained prominence in swaying opinion
in social media, “shills.” The first mention of online shills was in 1999
http://partners.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/10/circuits/articles/14spin.html. In
2016, they were used in the U.S. elections.30 Shill accounts promote their campaign
by directly engaging with those holding opposing opinions. These users complement
the work done by bots and crowdturfers by suppressing and distorting opposing
information on social media. Instead of creating new posts, these accounts usually do
this in the form of directed replies to the opposition. This is done to delegitimize users
who are spreading information that is contrary to the goals of their campaign. Shills
directly engage with other users, so they must be able to directly address the points
of a contrary opinion. This requires greater sophistication than bots can provide, and
a deeper level of training than is provided to crowdsourced workers (Lee, Tamilarasan,
and Caverlee 2013). Shills are professional users employed by campaign organizers
30http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/04/21/hillary-pac-spends-1-million-to-correct-
commenters-on-reddit-and-facebook.html.
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who seed these users with talking points and facts and then ask them to go and
engage with users holding differing opinions on social media sites. The requirement
that shills be paid professionals means that there are relatively few of them in the
wild; however, these users make a lot of noise.31 Following the 1:10:89 rule for content
creation on social media (Shirky 2008) we know that it takes very few users to affect
change online.
Shills, while a small contingent of the site, can greatly affect a social media platform.
If the users do not trust the content on a site to be from genuine users, they may go
elsewhere to obtain trustworthy information. If shills are left to run amok, then their
combative nature can prevent those with contrary opinions to theirs from posting,
reducing the authenticity of discourse on the site. If shills have their way, they will
substantially skew the content of a social media site, which skews statistics performed
on data from that site. It is critical that we find these shills in order to ensure that
the discourse that is carried out on social media is organic, free of paid promotional
content for any idea or candidate.
We propose a framework to categorize shills in online social media. Focusing on
one prominent social media site, Reddit, we develop a process that can describe the
behavior of shills. We demonstrate its efficacy by showing that it can be used to
differentiate shills from real users using real-world data.
5.3.1 Social Media Shills
The general term “shill” denotes an enthusiastic accomplice (Green 2011). The
term initially arose to describe a person who helps a salesman by drawing excitement
31The shills in our study post 23% more content than other users.
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for a product. Historically, when salesmen would come to a village to sell a product
they would place a shill in the crowd. After the salesman had described the product,
the shill would then speak up and loudly announce that the product had indeed
worked as advertised. In order for the shill to be effective, it is paramount that the
link between the salesman and the shill not be publicized: the shill must be perceived
as an ordinary individual. In doing so, the unsuspecting audience believes that the
product actually has merit, and will buy it hoping to have the same results.
This phenomenon has made its way into the online world (Steiglitz 2007), with
modern shills acting on behalf of their employers to encourage certain opinions in
social media. Online shills are users that are paid by a campaign or organization to
help manage their image online. Shills combat opposing information that is spread on
social media. This can be in the form of replies that prevent an opposing narrative
from taking root and spreading on the site. Further, shills behave differently than
true political supporters as they focus more on combating opposing opinion than
spreading promotional or supportive content. “Correct the Record,” an organization
which employs shills, states that it has “addressed more than 5,000 people that have
personally attacked Hillary Clinton on Twitter.”Shills behave in a different manner
from other covert users such as bots and crowdturfers, so it is unlikely that any existing
approach will be effective in identifying them. We attempt to identify patterns that
can be used to discover shills.
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5.3.2 Collecting Data for Studying Shills
The data we collect pertaining to shill accounts comes from Reddit32, where we
crawled and labeled users posting in a politically-active forum on the site. In this
section we describe the process by which we collected the data, and annotated the
users as shills. Finally, we provide some analysis on our labels to show that while we
may never be certain if the user is a shill, that they are exhibiting the properties that
we are looking for in shill detection.
Reddit is a large social media site where users share and comment on links. On
Reddit, posts are submitted to “subreddits”, which are groups of posts organized
around a common theme or interest. The scope of interest is initially set by the
organizers, or “moderators”, of the specific subreddit, however the content and general
discussion is provided by the people who read the subreddit, the “subscribers”. Users
on Reddit refer to subreddits with the /r/ prefix to denote that they are talking about
a subreddit. For example, if a user were to mention the bernie sanders subreddit, they
may include “/r/sandersforpresident” in their text. This convention is encouraged by
the site, which automatically links to the subreddit when it is mentioned in this way.
Given shills’ nature, we hypothesize that shills most commonly post in politically-
oriented subreddits. In the context of politics, subreddits exist at every granularity.
The “/r/politics” subreddit being the most general, inviting users from any political
orientation to post to the subreddit. Furthermore, there are entirely different subreddits
specifically designed for political candidates (e.g. /r/the_donald, /r/hillaryclinton),
as well as subreddits for specific interests (/r/timetolegalize for marijuana legalization,
/r/environmental_policy for discussion regarding climate protection, etc.). We selected
32http://www.reddit.com
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the /r/politics subreddit to crawl due to its generality. Because this subreddit
welcomes discussion from all political views, it contains many highly polarized groups
each supporting different major candidates within. In addition, this is the most likely
to invite shill activity: since people from all backgrounds are there they are more
likely to reach audiences outside of the ones that the shill agrees with; and we are
also more likely to find diverse opinion to trigger the shills into posting responses.
Furthermore, /r/politics is one of the largest subreddits on Reddit with over 3 million
subscribers, so shills may also be motivated to choose this subreddit for the large
audience which will read their posts.
We collected posts from the /r/politics subreddit the beginning of April, 2016
through mid-June 2016. For all of the links submitted to the subreddit, we gathered
all of the users who commented on or replied to any of them and collected the most
recent 1,000 comments and replies from each user. This data was crawled by using
Reddit’s REST API33.
After collecting the data, we assigned ground truth labels for the users: “shill,”
and “not-shill.” We employed three human annotators to label the user accounts. We
took a random sample of 185 users to annotate. In our sample, we only considered
users that posted at least 10 times. For a given user, the annotator was provided with
a text file containing at most the most recent 1,000 replies made by that user, with
each reply occupying a single line of the file. Subreddit information, timestamps, and
the user’s screen name are not provided. After reading all of the 1,000 replies by the
user, the human then made the assignment based on the following criteria:
1. Did the user’s replies entirely, or almost entirely, support one candidate?
2. Did the user’s posts generally contain claims to support their arguments?
33Adding “.json” to the end of any Reddit URL yields JSON representation of that page.
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3. Did the user explicitly mention a tie to any campaign?
It is important to note that for criterion 2 that the claims purported in the replies
did not need to be backed by citations, nor did they need to be true. All that was
required was that the user’s reply be supported by claims. If the annotator could
answer “yes” to the first two criteria, and “no” to the third, then the annotator would
mark this user as a shill. We took the intersection of the three sets of users identified
as shills by each annotator.
The labeling process for this problem is very difficult as there is no underlying
ground truth in the data. Despite our robust, multi-person approach to labeling
shills, we still do not know if they are actually shills or just people who are extremely
passionate about defending their candidate in online forums. Instead, we follow the
labeling approach that is taken in bot detection research (Chu et al. 2010; Lee, Eoff,
and Caverlee 2011), where we can at best be highly suspect that a user is a shill. Due
to the large amount of time required to annotate each user, we limited our labeling to
185 users. The dataset will be shared upon request.
Statistics of our dataset are shown in Table 14. Surprisingly, the three annotators
found a total of 17 shills within the dataset. This means that 9% of all of the users
we labeled are shills. This number is strikingly high. We attribute this high number
to the nature of the subreddit we crawled. /r/politics is very likely to accrue a large
amount of diverse and argumentative political discussion, the likes of which are prime
for shill activity. Furthermore, since /r/politics is so large, shills may deem it more
important to address posts created in this venue. Almost assuredly, this number
would be much smaller on another subreddit.
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Table 14: Dataset Statistics
Property Value
Users 9,379
Posts 6,754,832
Types 3,361,118
Tokens 120,341,645
Replies 6,754,832
Labeled 185
Labeled Non-Shills 168 (91%)
Labeled Shills 17 (9%)
5.3.3 Characterizing Shills
Shills are topic-focused, keeping their discussion limited to very specific political
examples, and they are more interested in politically-oriented topics than non-shill
users. Using these observations, we introduce a preliminary approach to characterize
them based upon their topical engagement. We extract features to help a machine
learning classifier differentiate shill accounts from real users.
5.3.4 Shill Characteristics
Many of the features we use are extracted with the help of Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003). LDA discovers underlying “topics” in
a corpus. In addition to the corpus, the algorithm takes “K,” the number of topics
the algorithm is to learn. With this input, LDA learns the following:
1. Topics. These are represented as ranked lists of keywords over the vocabulary of
the corpus, where the rank is determined by the words probability of occurring
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in the topic. We represent these lists as T, where Tij is the probability of word
i occurring in topic j.
2. Document × Topic affinity matrix. In addition to the topics, the model also
learns each document’s affinity for each topic. LDA learns the probability that
each document is generated from each of the K topics. This is represented as
Ddj , the affinity of user d for topic j.
We run LDA over each dataset, treating users as documents. Each document’s text is
a bag of words containing all of the text from that user’s posts.
Going forward we list the features based upon each of our aforementioned observa-
tions. We will describe the features from the perspective of one user, u.
1. Content Features. We extract features pertaining to the text that the user
writes in their posts.
a) Topic Affinities [K features]. These consist of the Du topic affinity features
from the results of LDA. This will help us to understand the degree to
which a user focuses on specific topics.
b) Affinity Entropy [1 feature]. Shills are likely to be focused around a
particular topic. Entropy (Gray 2011) is a measure of the randomness of a
probability distribution, with a greater entropy indicating a greater degree
of randomness. It is computed as:
hu = −
K∑
k=1
Duklog2D
u
k , (5.11)
which yields a single feature measuring the users focus around any specific
topic.
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2. Account Features We extract features that represent both the user’s activity
on the site, as well as how their content is perceived. These features are as
follows:
a) Daily Post Rate [1 feature]. The number of days in which the user has
posted on the site, out of the total days they are present in the last 1,000
comments. E.g., if the users last 1,000 comments appear during 230 unique
calendar days, then their score will be 4.35.
b) Subreddit Entropy [1 feature]. Reddit has natural mechanisms under which
users can categorize their content, “subreddits”. Subreddits are boards where
users post content pertaining to the underlying theme of the subreddit. We
measure the frequency that each user posts in each subreddit, and then
compute the entropy of the probability distribution. This measures the
diversity of the subreddits that the user posts in. Treating the frequency
of posting in each subreddit as a probability distribution, we compute the
entropy, or focus, that the user has for the subreddits.
c) Hour Probability [24 features]. This measures the probability that each
user posts in a given hour of the day. It may be that hired shills work
according to a schedule, and by calculating the probability at each hour we
may be able to learn their schedule. This consists of one feature for each
hour of the day.
d) Hour Entropy [1 feature]. This is the focus of the probability distribution
above. It is possible that the user may only log in for a brief period of time
each day to do their shilling. To capture this, we measure the focus of the
user around any hour of the day.
3. Community-Based Content Features The relative difference between the
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topics they focus on compared to the rest of the users in the dataset may be
equally important. In fact, in our investigation, we learned that shills tend to
oppose opinions in social media, meaning that they may focus on different topics
than those they are conversing with. Thus, we experiment with two feature
groups that can provide information about how different the user is from the
rest of the group.
a) Focus Topic Significance [K features]. This is measured as the z-
score (Casella and Berger 2001) of the difference between the focus of
the user on a topic against the focus of the community on the topic. For a
topic k ∈ [1, K], the feature is calculated as:
zuk =
Duk − µk
σk
(5.12)
where µk = 1|U |
∑
j∈U D
j
k is the average focus of a user on topic k, and
σk =
√
1
|U | [
∑
j∈U D
j
k − µk] is the standard deviation.
After feature extraction, each user is described by a total of: K topic affinity
features + 1 topic entropy feature + 27 account features +K topic significance features
= 2K + 28 features. In addition to measuring the performance of the classification
algorithms on the model, we will also investigate the impact of K on the results.
An important note about this set of features is that while not all features are
specifically designed to measure “shillness,” some are. Specifically, the “Focus Topic
Significance” is designed to measure this. Consider the case of cross validation, which
is what we use to select the models. If the shills in the training set have a particular
relative topic affinity, then that feature maybe picked up by the classifier in order to
identify further shills. We validate this finding in the feature importance section.
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Table 15: Confusion Matrix Showing the Average Cosine Similarity between the Two
Groups of Clusters.
Shill Not Shill
Shill 0.53 0.66
Not Shill 0.66 0.61
Feature Analysis: Clustering
We have collected a dataset of shills and non-shills and have proposed a set of
features to formally describe these users. We investigate how different these two
classes of users are. By setting K = 50, we investigate the separability of this dataset.
We look at the clusters that are formed by the labels. We compute the average
cosine similarity between all of the users in the shill class, and all of the users in the
nonshill class, and the average distance between the two classes. The results of this
measurement are shown in Table 15. Here we see that the within-cluster distance for
each class is smaller than the between cluster distance. This means that the users in
each cluster are more similar than the users between clusters, which is a promising
indication that there is a difference between the two classes.
Feature Analysis: User Behavior
Analyzing the key difference that describe the shill behavior versus non-shill
behavior was done using the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann and
Whitney 1947). The Wilcoxon rank-sum test ranks all values in two different groups
then finds whether one group ranking tends to be statistically different than the other
group ranking. The most significant shift was captured in the samples between the
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Figure 24: The Distribution of Feature Values for Features Identified as Most Important
by the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test.
shill and the non-shill groups in four different features (Subreddit Entropy, Topic
Affinity 38, 27, and 33) with α < 0.005. Figure 24 provides a visual description of
how shill behavior differs from non-shill. First, shills tend to demonstrate higher
topic affinity than non-shills. Second, shills demonstrate less Reddit entropy than
non-shills. Thus, inference into behavioral patterns given the statistical analysis leads
to a conclusion that shills tend to focus on topics relating to specific keywords such
as “Hillary”, “Clinton”, “Bernie”, and “Trump” discussions and seldom vary to other
non-political topics. Going forward, we will propose a classifier to separate the two
classes.
5.3.5 Identifying Shills
In this section we apply the data and feature extraction approach to build a
classifier that can leverage the labeled data to differentiate these two classes. After
building the classifier, we investigate how the classifier makes its decisions, what
features it determines are most important, and the source of classification errors.
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5.3.6 Shill Detection
We test various approaches in a standard machine learning framework. We use
10-fold cross validation. We report the average across the 10 runs. We compare several
classifiers, organized into four groups:
• Baselines.
i. Always-Shill: Assigns the “shill” label to every user.
ii. Random: Randomly assigns a label to each instance following the distri-
bution of labels in the training data.
iii. Clinton: Because we are studying pro-Clinton shills hired by Correct the
Record, we see if simply mentioning the candidate reflects shill behavior.
We denote any user that mentions “Clinton”, case insensitive, in over 10%
of their posts as a shill.
• Activists. A classifier that strives to find activists in political campaigns (Ran-
ganath et al. 2016). This is included to compare the task of shill detection to
identifying political activists.
• BoostOR. A recent classifier that detects bots (Morstatter, Wu, et al. 2016),
with code made available by the authors. This is to help understand the
differences between shill detection and bot detection.
• Shill Classifiers. Classifiers trained with the features described in the “Char-
acterizing Shills” section. We choose algorithms which produce interpretable
models in order to estimate the importance of different features.
Using the classification setup described, we test several classifiers for their ability
to differentiate the two classes. Due to the nature of the data, we do not evaluate
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deep learning classifiers. The results are shown in Table 16. These results can be
interpreted in several ways. First we see that the best classifier is Logistic Regression.
When this classifier identifies a shill, it is correct slightly under half of the time. The
recall is 45%, meaning that we detect just under half of the shills present in the data.
This elucidates the difficulty of the problem. Shills are people writing original text; it
is challenging to differentiate them from political enthusiasts.
Another result is the performance of the activist classifier proposed by Ranganath
et al. 2016. While their proposed approach is very strong for identifying advocates, it
does not perform well at identifying shills. This demonstrates that finding advocates
is a fundamentally different problem; advocates display different behavioral patterns.
Table 16: Classification Results.
Classifier Precision Recall F1
Random 0.050 0.050 0.050
BoostOR 0.183 0.150 0.165
Always-Shill 0.090 1.000 0.165
Clinton 0.112 1.000 0.201
Activists (Ranganath et al. 2016) 0.225 0.500 0.310
SVM 0.325 0.350 0.337
Decision Tree 0.335 0.550 0.417
Logistic Regression 0.475 0.450 0.462
Sensitivity to K
Many of the features we investigate are based upon the topics generated by LDA.
Thus far we have set the number of topics to K = 50. Here we investigate the
classifier’s sensitivity to K by varying it and seeing the results.
We vary K from 5 to 500, and plot the results in Figure 25. We see that initially
more topics are good, but after K = 50, more topics begin to add noise to the model
and actually decrease performance. Informed by these results, we conduct all future
experiments with K = 50 topics.
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Figure 25: F1 As a Function of the Number of Topics Used to Create the Dataset.
Here We See That the Performance of the Model Peaks at K = 50 Topics.
Feature Importance
In the above experiment, we evaluate several classification algorithms for their
ability to discern between the two classes. We provided the features we used to
make these classifications along with their justification. In this section we will rank
the features based on their predictive power to understand what facets are actually
contributing to the classification.
To rank the features we perform a feature ablation test, where we run the classifi-
cation algorithm once for each feature to test its importance. In each run, we test
the feature by assessing the F1 performance of the classifier with all features (p1) and
then re-assessing the performance with that feature removed (p2). The difference in
performance, p1 − p2, is used as that feature’s predictive power.
The most important features identified by this experiment can be seen in Table 17.
These results show two important observations about shill behavior. First, shills tend
to focus on topics differently than regular users. We know this because the top features
used to identify them are topic focus significance scores, as well as the topic affinity
entropy. This means that not only do shills focus on different topics than non-shills,
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Table 17: Most Important Features in Our Dataset. These Are the Features Which
Effected Performance by at Least 3%.
Feature Top 5 Topic Words p1 − p2
Subreddit Entropy (Not Applicable) 0.194
Topic 38 Affinity politicaldiscussion, sanders, 0.056
clinton, bernie, vote
Topic 27 Affinity politics, trump, hillary, 0.039
bernie, people
but they also are focused on just a handful of topics. We know this because the topic
entropy score helped to separate the two classes.
Error Analysis
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Figure 26: Low-Dimensional Embedding of the Features with Tags Comparing Their
Real Label with That Assigned by the Classifier. TP, TN, FP, and FN Are “True
Positives”, “True Negatives”, “False Positives”, and “False Negatives” Respectively.
To look at the differences between correctly-classified, and incorrectly-classified
instances, we plot a low-dimensional embedding of the data. Using Principle Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA), we extract the first two principle components of the data, and
119
plot each user according to their position along these two dimensions. Additionally,
we tag each instance based upon how it was classified, as either a true positive, true
negative, false positive, or false negative. This plot can be seen in Figure 26. Shills
tend to appear in the lower-left corner of the figure. Furthermore, almost all of the
true positives occupy this space with no true positive occurring outside of the lefthand
side of the figure. That is not to say that the classifier does not attempt to predict
shills outside of this region, however it does so incorrectly. False positives are present
throughout the main cluster of users at the left side of the plot. This tells us that the
rich and thought-out language used by shills enables them to camouflage themselves
and avoid detection. Another important distinction is that the classifier finds many
false positives in the bottom-left, meaning that the presence of shills with this feature
value can cause the classifier into identifying real users as shills in these instances.
Overall, the mixture of the users is a problem, with no clear separation based on the
PCA position. This is likely due to the similarity between shills and activists.
Identifying the Most Informative Shills
Our dataset contains very few positive instances, so the burden of providing
information about the positive class falls upon just a few instances. As such, it is
likely that there are a few users which help the classification. To measure the impact
of each individual user, we repeat the experiment above, except this time we hold out
a shill user from the dataset, and perform 10-fold cross validation again. We then
compare the performance with the performance of when every user is present.
We found that for 5 users, holding them out individually will drop the F1 by
more than 10.0%, meaning that their content strongly helps the classifier to identify
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Figure 27: Differences in Word Choices between Normal Shills and the Shills That
Add the Most Predictive Power in the Model. The X-Axis Is the Frequency of the
Word in the Corpus, and the Y -Axis Is the Probability That a Predictive Shill Uses
This Word, Divided by the Probability That a Regular Shill Uses It. Words above
100 Are Preferred by the Predictive Shills, and Words below This Line Are Preferred
by Normal Shills. We Annotate Words That Are Used Significantly More Than the
Other Class.
patterns within the shill class.34 This indicates that individual users do make a large
impact on the classification.
In light of these findings, it is natural to wonder what content drives these particular
users to give such a strong description of this class. In order to see how these users are
different from the rest of the shills. We plot the frequency of each word on the x-axis,
and its relative prevalence among the “predictive shill” users on the y-axis in Figure 27.
This plot shows us that the most predictive shills focus disproportionately on hot
button issues such as immigration. Furthermore, the super shills also mentioned
/r/sandersforpresident at a disproportionately higher rate than other shills, while
other shills focused on mentioning /r/hillaryclinton, and more informal words such as
34If all 5 of these users are held out together, the total drop in F1 performance is 17.0%.
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“lol” and “games” in their text.35 While shills in general stay away from these words,
these less-predictive shills use these words disproportionately more, meaning that they
may be less trained than the more predictive shills.
Comparing Shills with Other Covert Users
In the previous section we have proposed a method to identify shills. This method
works primarily due to the way the shills are characterized, which enables their
behavior to be captured by off-the-shelf algorithms. In this section, we investigate
whether the patterns identified by our method are specific to shills, or if their behavior
is also shared by other classes of covert users.
To make this comparison we test our framework at the task of bot detection. Using
a sample of bot users identified in the complete dataset of Reddit comments,36 in
May 2015, we collected the entire history of these 43 users. In order to make these
results comparable, we ensure the same class distribution as in the shill detection
task, collecting non-bot users. We verified their status as humans by comparing
their usernames with a list of known bots,37 and manually verifying their text for
the presence of bot activity (users posting repetitive, or nonsensical content were
removed). After our preprocessing, we were left with 432 non-bot users.38
35In this case, the word “games” is used in the context of the “games” that other candidates are
playing, and not in the context of video games.
36https://bigquery.cloud.google.com/table/fh-bigquery:reddit_comments.2015_05
37https://www.reddit.com/r/autowikibot/wiki/redditbots
38A list of users from both classes is available at https://goo.gl/PPsR8E.
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Table 18: Results of Different Approaches on the Bot Detection Task. “Shills” Is the
Logistic Regression Approach for Detecting Shills.
Approach Precision Recall F1
Shills 0.09 0.75 0.16
Always-Bot 0.09 1.00 0.17
BoostOR 0.68 0.58 0.63
Taking this list of users, we extract features from each user as described in the
“Categorizing Shills” section. We use 10-fold cross validation. We report the average
across the 10 runs. We use the classification approach identified as the best within the
shill task, the Logistic Regression classifier. The results of this experiment are shown
in the “Shills” row of Table 18. While our shill classifier is able to learn meaningful
patterns to separate shills from non-shills, it cannot learn patterns to separate bots
from non-bots.
To give a sense of the performance of the classifier, we compare with two other
approaches. The first is a baseline that simply classifies every user as a bot (“Always-
Bot” in Table 18). The other is a recent bot detection approach, BoostOR (Morstatter,
Wu, et al. 2016). The shill classifier performs worse than a simple baseline approach
on this task. BoostOR is able to significantly outperform these baselines, showing
that this task is feasible when using an approach that is designed for bot detection.
This shows that the shill classifier’s performance is not low due to the dataset being
too difficult, but instead because the shill feature set is not fit for bot detection. This
means that bot detection is a different problem from shill detection.
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5.3.7 Discussion
In this chapter we present the novel problem of shills in online social media. We
discussed how they can harm the authenticity of social media sites by injecting paid
content that favors their cause. We discuss how shills operate, and how their behavior
in the online space differs from similar tasks such as bot detection and finding covert
campaigns in social media. To back these observations, we collected a dataset of users
from /r/politics, a political Reddit forum, and labeled a selection of the users as shills
or as people. We find that 9% of all of the users on this forum are shills, a strikingly
high number. Based on our observations, we define a strategy to characterize these
users in a way that allows for automated approaches to identify them. Next, we
demonstrate the efficacy of this strategy by showing that we can build a classifier
to separate these instances. Our F1 performance in this task is superior to several
baselines. It is also superior to the state-of-the-art from activist detection, indicating
that identifying shills is a different problem.
After building the classifier itself, we investigated how it makes its predictions. We
found that the most discriminative feature was “Subreddit Entropy,” a feature that
measure the diversity of Subreddits the user posts to. This is an important finding
as it shows that shills are unable to behave as regular users due to the contraints
imposed on their time while shilling for their cause on the site. We also found that the
classifier learns a handful of topics that are focused upon by shill users. These topics
are politically-oriented with words like “trump,” “sanders,” and “law” ranking highly
in these topics. When LDA is trained with 50 topics, it yields the best performance.
We observed that not only are some features very important in the classification,
but so are some users. We found that for 5 of the 17 shills, removing one of them will
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reduce the classifiers F1 performance by more than 10%. These users are providing a
significant amount of information to the classifier. By plotting their content in relation
to the content of other shills, we observe that they focus more on words pertaining
to hot-button issues, such as immigration. Also, they tend to talk more about other
candidates.
Shill detection is an important problem because shills can change the discourse in
an online platform. Furthermore, shill detection is a difficult problem because shills
are real people who can perform certain activities to evade detection systems. Future
work seeks to improve the performance of the classification task. Other areas of work
could be to use the shills, once discovered, to better understand the leanings of a
political campaign. Also, shill detection may be more effective on social media sites
that offer richer features, such as a social network. Furthermore, we noticed that
shills who tend to focus on hot-button issues tend to give the most information to the
classifier. Focusing on these users during data collection may yield better results.
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Chapter 6
PERCEPTUAL BIAS IN SOCIAL DATA: CROSS-PLATFORM EMOJI
MISINTERPRETATION
Perceptual bias refers to when an entity matches its stimuli to their own pre-
conceived notions regarding the world (Gerber and Green 1999). This is usually
considered from a human standpoint, where people match what they see to what
they’ve experienced in the past. After people have formed a conclusion regarding
an issue, they are less likely to process future information in an objective fashion.
This is common in partisan politics, as evidenced in related work (Jerit and Barabas
2012). However, these perceptual biases can go beyond humans and can appear in
machine learning applications. In this chapter we will demonstrate one example of
how a perceptual bias can diminish the performance of machine learning models. We
will show that how a prior assumption about the meaning of a specific aspect of the
content of social media data, the emojis used by the users of a social media site, can
cause a reduction in the accuracy of a common text analysis task, sentiment analysis.
Social media and web communication are a major part of every day life for most
people. Sites like Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp all have hundreds of millions to
billions of users who communicate on these platforms each and every day. While images
and videos have become commonplace on these sites, text is still the predominant
method of communication. This happens on our smartphones, tablets, and computers
billions of times every day.
While communication through text has long been the norm, it still has many key
issues that keep it from having the depth of face-to-face conversation. One of these
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issues is the lack of emotional cues (Daft and Lengel 1986). When conversation is
carried out through text, the lack of non-verbal cues removes key emotional elements
from the conversation (Byron and Baldridge 2005). One solution to this problem
is emoticons, which are combinations of standard keyboard characters to create
facial representations of human emotion, e.g., :), :(, ^_^, and :D. While widely
used, there are only a limited number of character combinations that make a cogent
representation of a human emotion, and the exact meaning of many emoticons can be
ambiguous (Walther and D’Addario 2001). To provide for richer expression, “emojis”
can convey a richer set of non-verbal cues.
Emojis are a set of reserved characters that, when rendered, are small pictograms
that depict a facial expression, or other object. Unlike emoticons, these are not
combinations of characters devised by the users, but instead single characters that
are rendered as small pictures on the screen. There are currently over 1,800 different
emojis defined by the Unicode specification, a number that grows with each iteration
of the specification.39 These emojis are either facial expressions (e.g., “grinning face,”
, character code U+1F600),40 or ideograms (e.g., “birthday cake,” , character
code U+1F382).
While emojis have allowed for increased expression of emotion through text, they
have an inconsistency. That is, emojis are rendered differently on each platform.
Different fonts display the same character according to a different style; similarly, each
major platform has its own font to display these characters. With regular characters
this is not crucial as each character has a predefined meaning. Emojis do not enjoy
39http://www.unicode.org/Public/emoji/3.0/emoji-data.txt
40Unless otherwise noted, when an emoji appears inline, the depiction comes from Emoji One
(http://emojione.com/), which is considered the standard.
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this predefined definition, and these changes in rendering can have an impact on
the way that the emoji is interpreted. Emojis are often small depictions of human
faces, so slight variations can make the face look entirely different. This can cause
a different interpretation of the text than was initially intended by the author for
emotional interpretation to the text. This issue was raised in Miller et al. 2016, where
human workers on a crowdsourcing platform rated the sentiment of emojis. The
results of these ratings indicate that the same emoji can be perceived as positive
on some platforms, while it can be perceived as negative on others. Miller’s finding
is important, with repercussions for the 2 billion people who use a smartphone.41
Furthermore, recent research suggests that emojis are replacing emoticons on social
media sites such as Twitter (Pavalanathan and Eisenstein 2015). With so many people
affected by this possibility for miscommunication, it is important that we study the
implications and possible solutions to this problem.
In this chapter, we answer the following research questions:
RQ1 Does misinterpretation based upon emoji rendering occur in real world data?
Miller et al. 2016 discovered this possibility for misinterpretation using surveys.
We assess if these phenomena appear in real world social media datasets.
RQ2 What is the scale of this misinterpretation? If this misinterpretation manifests,
that does not necessarily mean that it affects a vast array of communication.
We measure the extent to which communication on one social network, Twitter,
is affected by misinterpretable emojis.
RQ3 How can the problem of cross-platform emoji interpretation be addressed? Using
our insights from the first two analytical portions, we construct a solution that
produces a mapping of emojis from one platform to those on another.
41https://www.statista.com/statistics/330695/number-of-smartphone-users-worldwide/
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Table 19: Amount of Data Collected by Platform. The “Source(s)” Column Indicates
the Applications We Chose to Represent Each Platform.
Platform Source(s) Tweets
Android Twitter for Android 5,839,392
iOS Twitter for iPad 12,850,344
Twitter for iPhone
iOS
Twitter Twitter Web Client 1,562,655
Windows Twitter for Windows Phone 114,175
Twitter for Windows
Total 20,366,566
RQ4 Does correcting for emoji misinterpretation have a meaningful effect on analysis?
We measure the usefulness of our mapping by applying it to a common text
analysis task: sentiment analysis. We show that the performance is increased
by mapping all tweets to a common emoji language.
6.1 Analyzing Platform-Specific Emoji Usage
Previous work by Miller et al. 2016, 2017 identified platform-specific emoji meaning
by carrying out surveys with human participants on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. While
these insights are extremely useful, we must verify that these patterns truly occur in
real-world data. In this section we outline our process for collecting an emoji dataset
and measure the effect to which platform plays a role in the use of emojis.
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6.1.1 Collecting a Platform-Specific Emoji Dataset
The dataset used in this work consists of social media posts collected from Twitter.
Twitter is an attractive option for our analysis for several reasons. First, it is large.
With approximately 500 million tweets each day, it is one of the largest social media
sites. Also, because of its 140-character limit, users may be prone to use emojis
because they can help the user to be more expressive within the restrictive character
limit. Furthermore, Twitter, like many other social networking sites, is a place where
people post using many different platforms. Additionally, the site makes the source of
the post available as part of its metadata.
To collect the dataset used in this work, we manually identify a subset of emojis
that have human faces or other emotional signals. This is to avoid emojis which lack
a natural expression of emotion such as “helicopter” (U+1F681), and “mantelpiece
clock” (U+1F570). The full list of codes used in the data collection will be released
upon request. Using this list of emojis we query Twitter’s Filter API,42 which takes
as input a list of keywords to track, using our list of emojis. We tracked this data for
28 days, collecting a total of 20 million tweets.
Because the nature of this work is focused on the platform-specific nature of the
emojis, we separate the tweets based on the platform from which they were posted.
Twitter is an open platform, meaning that it has a fully documented and available
API which any third party can use to make software to post to Twitter. While
Twitter does not explicitly mention which platform the user used to write the tweet,
they do provide details about the software used to author the tweet in their “source”
field. This source is made available in the data that comes from their APIs. In some
42https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/reference/post/statuses/filter
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Table 20: Average Jaccard Coefficient of Emojis across Platforms. Random Indicates
a Random Sample across All Tweets of the Size of the iOS Corpus.
Android iOS Twitter Windows Random
Android 1.000 0.153 0.111 0.062 0.010
iOS 0.153 1.000 0.086 0.052 0.018
Twitter 0.111 0.086 1.000 0.047 0.005
Windows 0.062 0.052 0.047 1.000 0.002
Random 0.010 0.018 0.005 0.002 1.000
cases, the “source” is a clear indication of the platform because some software is only
available on one platform. We use these when determining the platform from which
the tweet was posted. We identify four platforms with distinct emoji sets according to
Emojipedia:43 iOS, Android, Windows, and Twitter. We select these because they are
major platforms. There are two reasons behind this. First, the results obtained from
these platforms will apply to more users on the social media site. Second, by choosing
large platforms we can accrue a more sizable dataset, which will yield a more stable
mapping. Statistics of the dataset, as well as the applications we selected to represent
each platform, are shown in Table 19.
Now that we have collected an emoji dataset, we will continue to investigate the
differences between the usage of emojis on different platforms. Towards answering
RQ1, this analysis is performed from two perspectives: 1) the positioning of the
emojis within a word embedding, and 2) the sentiment of the posts in which the
emojis appear.
43http://emojipedia.org/
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6.1.2 Measuring Emoji Embedding Agreement
First, we investigate how consistent the embeddings of the emojis are across
platforms. Word2Vec (Mikolov et al. 2013), a word embedding algorithm, learns a
vector for each word in the vocabulary. For a given word, the vector is constructed
based upon the neighboring words each time the given word is used. Thus, we employ
this technique to measure how consistent the usage of emojis is across platforms.
First, we build a base word embedding by training a SkipGram Word2Vec model
using the entire dataset with emojis removed.44 Then we use this base embedding to
train a platform-specific embedding by adding the emojis back in and updating the
model with the new data. It is important to note that we do not update non-emoji
words, we only update the vectors of the newly-added emojis. After following this
process, we have 4 platform-specific emoji embeddings. To give a sense of how these
deviate from general Twitter conversation, we also create a platform-agnostic word
embedding by training a random sample of tweets of the size of the iOS platform.
Word embeddings have the property that words that are more semantically similar
will be embedded closer together (Mikolov et al. 2013), where “closeness” is defined
by cosine similarity. We compare the usage of the emojis on each platform by seeing
the words that are embedded closest to each emoji. For each platform, we extract
the closest 1,000 words to the emoji. To compare the differences across platforms, we
compute the Jaccard coefficient between the top 1,000 on the first platform and the
top 1,000 on the second. We compute the average Jaccard coefficient across all emojis.
The results of this experiment are shown in Table 20. The results indicate that
the emojis are embedded next to very different words across models. The most
44This process is explained in greater detail in Section 6.2.1.
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Figure 28: Average Sentiment for Each Platform by Emoji. Error Bars Indicate the
Variance Calculated from the Bootstrapped Samples. A Sentiment Score of 0.0 Is
“Neutral,” 1.0 Is “Perfectly Positive,” and -1.0 Is “Perfectly Negative.” the X-Axis
Labels Indicate the Unicode Character Code of the Emoji.
agreeing platforms are iOS and Android, where an average of 153 words are common
across the top 1,000 in the emojis. We also note that Windows has a much lower
average agreement than other models. Finally, all platforms are extremely different
from a random sample. This means that combining tweets from all platforms, as is
done in many analytical tasks, will yield a significantly different representation than
considering each platform individually.
While we have discovered that the emojis are used in different contexts across
platforms, that does not necessarily mean that their meaning is perceived differently.
To better answer this question, we assess the sentiment of the tweets in which the
emojis occur.
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6.1.3 Assessing Emoji Sentiment
Having collected an emoji dataset, we continue to see if the usage of the emojis is
different across platforms. To measure the consistency of the meaning of the emoji,
we perform sentiment analysis on the tweets containing the emoji. Using the Pattern
library’s sentiment analysis tool,45 we compute the average sentiment for each emoji
on each platform. This is done by removing the emoji from the tweet and using the
sentiment analysis tool to compute the sentiment score for the remaining text. Finally,
we consider the possibility that each platform may have a different sentiment “bias,”
that is the sentiment expressed on those platforms is different. For example, Windows
Phone may be preferred by business users who are less likely to express negative
sentiment in their posts. To account for this, we take the average sentiment across all
tweets on the platform, and subtract that from the emoji’s score.46 We then take the
average sentiment across all tweets in which the emoji occurs and plot the average in
Figure 28. Because we only have one corpus for each platform, we bootstrapp (Efron
and Tibshirani 1994) the corpus to obtain confidence intervals. By sampling with
replacement, we create 100 bootstrapped samples and reproduce the process above to
understand the variance in the data. This is how we obtain the confidence intervals
displayed in Figure 28.
The results of this experiment show several phenomena about the usage of emojis
online. First, we see that in many of the emojis that there is a significant difference
between the sentiment in at least two of the platforms. Among those, some even have
45http://www.clips.ua.ac.be/pages/pattern
46All platforms have roughly the same sentiment bias of +0.20 with the exception of Windows
Phone with a sentiment bias of +0.30.
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Table 21: Example Emojis Provided to Illustrate the Difference in Meaning. The
Names and Codes Are Official, Provided by the Emoji Unicode Standard.
Name Code Android iOS Twitter Windows
Fearful Face U+1F628
Clapping Hands U+1F44F
diverging sentiment polarities. In these cases, if one were to read only the tweets from
a particular platform, they would think that emoji has a completely different meaning
than it does on another platform. To illustrate this point, we provide an example of
the emoji differences. We include their official definition according to the Unicode
standard,47 and their depiction across the different platforms in Table 21. Take, for
example, the “fearful face” emoji. In the case of this emoji, Figure 28 indicates that
Android, iOS, and Twitter all have this emoji hovering at the roughly “neutral” area
of the sentiment spectrum. Windows, however, is an extreme outlier with most users
including this emoji in positive tweets. The intuition behind this phenomenon is
demonstrated clearly by the “Fearful Face” emoji shown in Table 21, where Android,
iOS, and Twitter display the emoji completely differently from Windows. We speculate
that the difference in the way the emojis forehead is rendered could cause this difference
in interpretation. Another difference that appears in the “Clapping Hands” emoji,
this time with Twitter being the outlier. Android, iOS, and Windows all clearly show
two hands with action lines indicating that they are moving together. Twitter, on the
other hand, is less perceptible. Only one hand is clearly visible, and this could give
the impression of a “slap” motion, yielding the more negative sentiment.
We have now conducted two experiments on the cross-platform use of emojis.
These experiments both illustrate that the use of emojis is platform specific, answering
47http://unicode.org/emoji/charts/full-emoji-list.html
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RQ1. In the case of our word embedding experiment, we find that the words that
neighbor a certain emoji are vastly different between platforms, indicating that they
are used in different contexts. This point is furthered by our sentiment analysis
experiment, where we found that some emojis have significantly different sentiment
scores across platforms, confirming the results of Miller et al. 2016 on a large-scale,
real-world dataset.
6.1.4 The Scale of Misinterpretation
We continue to address RQ2, which involves measuring the scale at which emojis
can contribute to miscommunication across platforms. We have used real-world data
to show that this problem exists, however, we do not know the extent to which users
are affected by this phenomenon. Is this a wide-reaching problem impinging most
Twitter users or is it an esoteric issue restricted to the few users who happen to include
emojis in their text?
Based on the results of our experiment, we find that 38.2% of all emojis yield a
statistically significant sentiment difference between different platforms. While this
is a minority, these emojis appear in 73.4% of all of all the tweets in our dataset.
Since our dataset was collected using emojis, we need to leverage outside information
to estimate the impact for all of Twitter. To estimate the fraction of tweets using
these emojis, we use the Sample API,48 which provides a 1% sample of all of the
tweets on Twitter, irrespective of whether they contain an emoji. We collected data
from the Sample API during the same time period we collected the emoji dataset.
Through analyzing this data, we observe that of the 94,233,024 tweets we collected
48https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/reference/get/statuses/sample
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from the Sample API during this time period, 8,129,483 tweets (8.627%) use emojis
that are prone to misinterpretation. In other words, 1 in every 11 tweets sent on
Twitter contain an emoji that has a statistically significant interpretation to a user on
a different platform.
These findings indicate that there is a need to disambiguate emojis across platforms.
To this end, the rest of this chapter proposes a strategy for generating a mapping
which can disambiguate emoji choice across platforms. Next, we evaluate this mapping
to show that it can increase the performance of sentiment analysis tasks.
(a) Platform-Independent Word Embedding
(b) Platform-Dependent Emoji Embedding
Figure 29: An Illustration of Platform-Dependent Emoji Mapping Construction. The
Three Rectangles Blue, Green, Red Means Corpus of Three Platforms. Each Line Is a
Sentence. Triangle and Star Denote Emojis. Red Triangle Means an Emoji in Red
Platform While Yellow Triangle Means the Same Emoji in Yellow Platform.
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6.2 A Cross-Platform Emoji Mapping Solution
The fact that the representations of emojis are different both from the perspective
of the embedding as well as the sentiment suggests that a mapping may help us
disambiguate emoji meaning across platforms. But how can we construct such a
mapping? In this section, we describe our approach to constructing a platform-
dependent emoji mapping. This is done towards the goal of answering RQ3. The
goal of this mapping is to provide a translation from an emoji on one platform to
its corresponding emoji on another. The purpose of the platform-dependent emoji
mapping is to disambiguate platform-specific emoji interpretation. To construct the
cross-platform emoji mapping, we need to understand the semantic meaning and
the sentiment polarity of the emojis on each platform. We then can construct the
platform-dependent mapping by identifying emojis that have the closest semantic and
sentiment polarities across platforms. Thus, the key step is to learn the representation
of emojis from the texts on each platform such that the representations capture the
platform-dependent semantic meanings of emojis and also allow simple similarity
matching to construct the mapping.
Recent advances in natural language processing suggest that word embeddings
such as Skip-gram (Mikolov et al. 2013) and GloVe (Pennington, Socher, and Manning
2014), which represent each word as a low-dimensional distributional vector, are able to
capture the semantic meanings of words. The low-dimensional vector representations
also allow a similarity calculation using cosine or Eulidean distance, which eases
the mapping construction. In addition, recent findings on emoji analysis (Barbieri,
Ronzano, and Saggion 2016; Eisner et al. 2016) demonstrate that by treating each
emoji as a word and performing Skip-gram on texts, the vector representation learned
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by Skip-gram can capture semantic meanings and sentiment polarities of emojis, which
improve the performance of sentiment classification. Therefore, word embedding is a
natural choice to learn platform-dependent semantic meanings of words and emojis
for mapping construction.
While word embeddings may be suitable for this task, there are two challenges
which we must overcome in order to create the mapping. The first challenge is that
we must find a way to map emojis from a source platform to their true equivalent
semantic emoji on the target platform. The second challenge is that when we build
our platform-specific embedding, the position of the words will change, as well as the
emojis. Thus, we need to figure out a way to represent the words within a common
space first, so that we can extend it to measure the emojis relative to the words. Our
solution addresses both of these challenges.
In the subsequent sections we will introduce in detail how we leverage a word
embedding approach to build a platform-dependent emoji embedding and how to use
the embedding to construct the mapping.
6.2.1 Building the Embedding
For simplicity of explanation, let Tp, p = 1, . . . , P be the set of tweets from each
platform. The process of building word and emoji embeddings are illustrated in Figure
29. As shown in Figure 29a, since the interpretation of words are platform-dependent,
for each corpus Tp, we first remove the emojis, which are denoted as T˜p. We then
combine T˜p, p = 1, . . . , P , as one large corpus T˜ . Then Skip-gram is applied on T˜ to
learn word embedding W ∈ RK×N , where K is dimension of the vector representation
and N is the size of the vocabulary without emojis. The advantages of combining T˜p,
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p = 1, ..., P , as one large corpus T˜ are two-fold: (i) we obtain a large corpus which
allows us to train a better word embedding; and (ii) word embedding in each platform
is the same, which satisfies the assumption that word interprations are the same for
each platform. After the platform-independent word embedding is learned, then we
can learn the platform-dependent embeddings for emojis. The process is depicted in
Figure 29b. For each corpus Tp, as the process of Skip-gram, we first use a context
window of size 5 to extract the neighboring words of emojis in the corpus. Let (ei, wj)
denote a pair of neighboring words, where ei means emoji i and wj means word j.
The extracted pairs are then put into the set Pp. We then learn the representation of
emoji ei in corpus Tp by optimizing the following problem:
min
epi
∑
wj :(ei,wj)∈Pp
(
log σ(wTj e
p
i ) +
N∑
k=1
log σ(−wTk epi )
)
(6.1)
where epi is the vector representation of ei in corpus Tp. Equation 6.1 is essentially the
negative sampling form of the objective function of the Skip-gram approach, where
we try to learn the emoji representaion which is able to predict the neighboring words.
Note that the difference with Skip-gram is that word embeddings W is fixed across
different corpus, we only learn epi . We do the same thing for each corpus, which gives
us epi , p = 1, . . . , P , i.e., the vector representations of the same emoji in different
platforms.
6.2.2 Constructing the Mapping
In this section, we detail the emoji mapping construction process. To construct
the mapping between emojis across different platforms, we consider it in a pair-wise
scenario. We treat one platform as the source platform and the other as the target
platform. Without loss of generality, let E = {ei, i ∈ {1, ...,m}} be the set of emojis
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that occur in both platforms. By learning the emoji embedding representations in
each platform, we are able to capture the platform-dependent semantic features for
the emojis. Thus, given an emoji in the source platform, we can leverage the emoji
embedding representation to connect the semantic space between the source and target
platforms, and then find the most similar emoji in the target platform.
Specifically, based on all the emoji embeddings from the source platform {esi , i ∈
{1, ...,m}} and target platform {eti, i ∈ {1, ...,m}}, we want to map the most similar
emoji in target platform for each emoji in the source platform. To compute the
similarity of two emoji embeddings, we adopt the cosine similarity measure as follows,
sim(esi , e
t
j) =
esi · etj
||esi || · ||etj||
(6.2)
Given an emoji ei in the source platform, we first compute the similarity between ei
with all emojis in target platform. Then we select the emoji which gives the maximum
similarity score. We solve the following objective function to obtain the mapping
emoji eˆj in target platform for ei,
eˆj = arg max
ej∈E
sim(esi , e
t
j) (6.3)
we then get a mapping pair (ei, eˆj), where the first emoji is from the source platform
and the second one is from the target platform. Note that the emoji mappings are
directional, which means if (ei, eˆj) is a mapping pair, (eˆj, ei) is not necessarily a
mapping pair.
6.3 Evaluating the Mapping
Now that we have presented the methodology for constructing the emoji mapping,
we will validate its utility, answering RQ4. We measure the utility of our mapping by
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Figure 30: Performance Results across All “Source” X “Target” Pairs. Asterisks
Indicate (Source, Target) Pairs Where the Mapping Is Not Significantly Better Than
the Two Baselines. F1 Is Computed with Respect to the “Positive” Class. Tweets with
Sentiment Scores in the Range of (-0.2, 0.2) were Deleted.
seeing how well it can help in a common text analysis task: sentiment analysis. We
design experiments to show that the sentiment analysis task is improved by applying
our emoji mapping to the data to bolster the consistency of analogy meaning in the
dataset. This simultaneously shows the efficacy of our approach as well as the extent
to which emoji ambiguity plays in standard text analysis tasks.
6.3.1 Predictive Evaluation
We have shown that emoji usage is different across platforms. This means that
the same emoji can have different sentiment meanings across platforms. From a
machine learning perspective, this means that platform-specific emoji renderings
introduce noise into the dataset, ultimately lowering the classification performance.
We hypothesize that by applying our mapping we are in effect converting the dataset
into a single language emoji dataset, and the consistent emoji language will help in
assigning a sentiment label.
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6.3.2 Experimental Setup
In each experiment, we evaluate our mapping using a pair of platforms. One of
the platforms is the “source”, and another is the “target.” The experiment consists of
two phases. In the first phase, we mix the data from both platforms together, perform
sentiment analysis, and measure the accuracy using 5-fold cross validation. We call
the average accuracy across all 5 folds “A1.” In phase two, we apply the mapping to
the emojis on the “target” platform, and then repeat the process in phase one. We
call the average accuracy from this experiment “A2.” We measure the effectiveness of
the mapping as A2 - A1.
In preprocessing, we remove stopwords, and strip the case from all words. We
tokenize the dataset using the “TweetTokenizer” module in Python’s NLTK (Bird,
Klein, and Loper 2009). Following the labeling approach outlined previously, we use
the VADER library to assign a sentiment score to each tweet as ground truth.The
sentiment score provided by this library is a continuous value from [-1.0, 1.0]. We
convert this problem to a binary classification task. We delete all tweets in the range
(-0.2, 0.2) to ignore ambiguous cases. We then assign the sign of the label from the
Pattern library as the label of the tweet. When training the word embeddings as well
as the emoji embeddings, we use K = 20 as the number of dimensions. To prevent
information leakage between the training and test sets, the emoji mapping used in
these experiments is built using data collected from September 23rd, 2016 - October
4th, 2016. The training and test instances used in our cross validation experiments
are taken from October 5th, 2016 - October 20th, 2016.
Each tweet is represented by the average of the word vectors for all of the words
W ′ and emojis E ′ in the tweet. We always use the target embedding for emojis. Thus,
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a tweet is represented as follows:
repr =
1
|W ′|
∑
wk∈W ′
wk +
1
|E ′|
∑
ei∈E ′
eti, (6.4)
where w and et are word embedding and target platform emoji embedding. When
the mapping is applied, the representation is as follows:
repr_map =
1
|W ′|
∑
wk∈W ′
wk +
1
|E ′|
∑
ej∈E ′
eˆtj, (6.5)
where eˆj is the mapping of the target emoji on the source platform.
Having extracted the data, the labels, and formalized the representation, we use
SVM to build a classifier using 5-fold cross validation. The only difference between
each set up is how each tweet is represented. We compare three tweet representations:
1. Mapping. This is the representation where the emojis in the target platform
are mapped to the emojis in the source platform. This corresponds to the
representation obtained by Equation 6.5.
2. No Mapping. This is the representation when no mapping is applied. This is
obtained by the representation in Equation 6.4.
3. No Emojis. Our hypothesis is that the incorrect emojis are adding noise to our
dataset, which hinders classification. Aside from our proposed solution, another
way to de-noise the dataset is to simply remove the emojis. We do this by using
the following representation formula:
repr_noemoji =
1
|W ′|
∑
wk∈W ′
wk. (6.6)
Emojis are simply not considered in the resulting feature representation.
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6.3.3 Experimental Results
We report the average across the 5 folds in Figure 30. The results overall are
encouraging. In most of the source/target pairs we obtain significantly better results
than both doing nothing, and removing the emojis. Further, we note that removing
the emojis beats doing nothing in almost all of the cases, further validating our noise
assumption. The only two pairs where the mapping does not obtain significantly
better results are iOS → Windows (“source” → “target”), and Android → Windows.
The lower results across these two cases could be a side effect of the nature of the
Windows emojis. The results of our previous analysis indicate that the Windows
emoji set is significantly different from the rest in many cases, and that could prevent
us from learning a quality mapping.
The results in Figure 30 indicate that we can obtain a significant (sometimes as
much as 25%) gain in sentiment classification accuracy for some pairs. It is important
to note that these experiments were carried out using only tweets that contained
emojis, which is due to the way the dataset was collected. Therefore, an improvement
of this magnitude can only be achieved on a similar dataset.
Using the random 1% sample of Twitter data introduced in Section 6.1.4, we
discover that 15.0% of all tweets contain at least one of any emoji. Our analysis from
the same section indicates that 8.627% of all tweets, and thus 57.5% of tweets containing
an emoji are affected by this phenomenon. This justifies the huge improvements seen
in Figure 30. We speculate that another factor that contributes to the superior
performance is the large amount of data upon which the embeddings were trained.
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6.3.4 Results by Sentiment Threshold
In the previous experiment we removed tweets that had a sentiment score between
(-0.2, 0.2). The motivation behind this step is that tweets within this threshold were
so ambiguous that they could not be meaningfully assessed for sentiment. In this
section, we vary this parameter to see how robust our method is to ambiguous tweets.
We vary the sentiment threshold from 0.1 (leaving many ambiguous tweets) to 0.9
(leaving only the most sentiment-expressive tweets).
Instead of showing the results of every possible combination, which is impossible
due to space limitations, we instead test whether the two sets of results are significantly
different from each other. The T-test tests the null hypothesis that the means of the
two distributions are equal. The results can be seen in Table 22 for the comparison
between Mapping and No Mapping, and in Table 23 for the comparison between
Mapping and No Emoji. In the first case we can easily reject this null hypothesis at
the α = 0.05 significance level in all cases except for iOS→Windows. Despite passing
the significance bar, this is pair still yields the least significant result in Table 23.
This is consistent with our previous result, where this particular mapping did not fare
significantly better, and further supports our suspicion that Windows is an outlier
due to the way it renders emojis.
6.4 Discussion
In this work, we set out to answer a series of questions regarding the nature and
extent of cross-platform emoji misinterpretation, and to provide a solution that can
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Table 22: Sentiment Threshold Significance T-Test between “Mapping” and “No Map-
ping” Experimental Designs. The Only Insignificant Mapping Is “iOS → Windows.”
Accuracy F1
Twitter→Windows 3.538e-09 1.200e-05
Twitter→Android 2.493e-08 8.754e-07
Twitter→iOS 8.071e-08 4.887e-07
Windows→Twitter 4.418e-07 5.687e-05
Windows→Android 3.538e-09 8.440e-07
Windows→iOS 2.115e-08 1.960e-05
Android→Twitter 1.234e-07 1.193e-05
Android→Windows 2.586e-07 3.037e-03
Android→iOS 2.081e-04 6.212e-06
iOS→Twitter 2.726e-06 1.313e-05
iOS→Windows 0.294 0.094
iOS→Android 8.877e-08 3.407e-06
help researchers and practitioners to overcome this platform-specific inconsistency in
their analysis. In the introduction, we outlined four research questions based around
these issues. Here, we summarize our findings as they pertain to each question and
end with a discussion of areas of future work.
RQ1 Does misinterpretation based upon emoji rendering occur in real world data?
To perform this study we use Twitter, a large, open platform where users post hundreds
of millions of tweets per day, and where the data made available by Twitter contains the
source from which the tweet was posted, which can be used to identify the underlying
platform. We find that the sentiment of the tweets in which emojis occur differs
widely and significantly across platforms. In multiple cases, the same emoji exhibited
opposing sentiment polarities on different platforms. This finding goes beyond surveys
done in Miller et al. 2016 to find these patterns in real-world data.
RQ2 What is the scale of this misinterpretation? By analyzing a random sample
of tweets, we obtain that 8.627%, or roughly 1 in every 11 of all of the tweets contain
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Table 23: Sentiment Threshold Significance T-Test between “Mapping” and “No Emoji”
Experimental Designs. Significance T-Test Results for Sentiment Classification with
Respect to Sentiment Threshold. All the Results Are Significant with α = 0.05.
Accuracy F1
Twitter→Windows 2.466e-06 5.142e-08
Twitter→Android 8.818e-09 1.923e-09
Twitter→iOS 6.121e-08 2.400e-08
Windows→Twitter 6.047e-08 1.665e-07
Windows→Android 3.293e-08 3.141e-07
Windows→iOS 9.665e-08 1.417e-06
Android→Twitter 3.525e-06 2.021e-06
Android→Windows 1.744e-03 1.124e-04
Android→iOS 7.423e-08 8.920e-09
iOS→Twitter 2.078e-05 2.954e-06
iOS→Windows 3.701e-04 3.399e-02
iOS→Android 3.303e-08 4.338e-08
an emoji that is used in a statistically significantly different fashion on a different
platform.
RQ3 How can the problem of cross-platform emoji interpretation be addressed?
With these findings in mind, we endeavor to construct an emoji mapping to help
researchers, practitioners, and even readers of social media data to better understand
the intended message of the sender given their platform-specific emoji mapping. By
leveraging word embeddings, we are able to exploit the property that “similar words are
embedded closer together” in order to find the corresponding emoji across platforms
and build an (emoji, platform) → (emoji, platform) mapping.
RQ4 Does correcting for emoji misinterpretation have a meaningful effect on
analysis? We evaluate the effectiveness of our embedding by applying it to sentiment
analysis. We chose sentiment analysis as it is a prediction problem very common
to social media data. We show that by mapping all tweets to a consistent emoji
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vocabulary, we can significantly increase the performance of sentiment analysis by
diminishing the amount of emoji noise in the dataset.
This work opens up the doors for many areas of research. While we have largely
explored this platform disagreement in emoji meanings from the perspective of com-
putational and predictive tools, it certainly is not limited to this. In fact, it may be
useful to include our mapping in user interfaces in order to increase understanding
between individuals communicating on different platforms. Alternatively, social media
platforms can take the approach of a “closed” platform, where all platforms conform
to a single emoji set. WhatsApp is an exemplar of this closed approach.
There are many possible extensions to our mapping approach. For example, our
mapping assumes that each emoji will have an analogue on the target platform. That
is not always the case. For instance, the clown emoji (“clown face,” , character code
U+1F921) exists on Android, Twitter, and Windows Phone, but it is not available
on iOS at the time of this writing. Furthermore, our mapping only consists of four
platforms, a limitation. With sufficient data the mapping can be extended to represent
many more. Resolving these issues are key to improving the utility of our mapping.
The mapping, code, and data used in this work is available in accordance with
Twitter’s data sharing policies online.49 We provide all of the performance scores used
to obtain the significance results from the sentiment threshold experiment, as well
as an expanded version of Figure 28, containing all of the emojis considered in the
analysis.
49http://www.public.asu.edu/ fmorstat/emojimapping/
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter concludes the dissertation with a summary of my contributions and
a look towards future directions of this thesis.
7.1 Methodological Contributions
Here we discuss the methodological contributions made in this thesis including the
technical and algorithmic contributions we made throughout.
1. Discovering Bias in Social Media APIs. I introduce a methodology for
identifying bias in social data APIs. Introduced in Chapter 3, this methodology
uses statistical techniques to identify the extent to which a dataset collected
from social media differs from the true population. An important part of this
methodology is the way in which I create multiple samples from the population for
more robust evaluation of these statistical difference. However, this methodology
relies on the full population, which is not a valid assumption for researchers to
have given the limiting cost. Due to this limitation, this dissertation provides
other ways of validating these differences.
2. Statistical Techniques for Assessing Bias without the Firehose. In
Chapter 4, I introduce a new methodology for identifying sample bias in the API
without the need for the Firehose. This works by comparing the data with other
sources of data which are readily available for researchers. This methodology
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works by bootstapping these sources and creating confidence intervals for how
biased these data sources are.
3. Algorithms for Collecting Data with less Sampling Bias. While identify-
ing data collection bias is important for researchers to understand the limitations
of their data, it is ideal to collect a dataset that is not biased to begin with.
Towards this end, I have developed several methodologies that collect data from
these APIs in such a way that they contain less sampling bias. These methods
rely on clustering techniques to reparameterize the queries to the API in such
a way that a larger sample is gleaned from these resources. I verify that these
samples are indeed a more accurate representation of the data from the Firehose.
4. Algorithms for Detecting Malicious Users. In this dissertation, I view
these from two angles. First, from the perspective of users who intentionally
manipulate the data from the APIs in order to make their messaging seem more
prominent. Secondly, from the perspective of bot detection where I develop a
new approach to identify more bots in a social media dataset.
a) Bots manipulating the APIs. In Chapter 6 I develop an algorithm to prove
that it is possible to build bots in such a way that they will be able to
disproportionately skew the content of the Sample API. We then develop
a methodology that uses knowledge about the limitations that Twitter
imposes on users to expose the bots that are carrying out these attacks.
b) Improving bot detection approaches. Most bot detection approaches focus
on precision, or ensuring that the users that they identify as bots are
correct. While precision is important from the perspective of companies to
lower the chance of enraging real users, it is less important from a research
perspective. When using algorithms that focus on precision, we find that
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these algorithms still leave a number of bots in the dataset. Thus, it is
crucial that these algorithms also focus on recall. In Chapter 7 we developed
a new algorithm which is a tweak on AdaBoost to improve the recall of
bot detection algorithms. We showed that this methodology can achieve
superior performance to state-of-the-art bot detection algorithms.
5. Identifying and Correcting Perceptual Bias in Social Media Data. In
the penultimate chapter of this thesis, I shed light on the problem of perceptual
bias in social data. That is, even with a dataset collected using a representative
sample and after removing the bots, there are ways in which we perceive the
data that do not match reality. One way is the way in which we interpret the
way users choose emojis for their tweets. Prior work has discovered that emoji
use varies across platforms. I show how it can hinder a common task done on
social media data: sentiment analysis. I also develop a methodology which can
construct a mapping from emojis on one platform to those on another.
7.2 Future Directions
These findings pave the way for many areas of future work, both from the angle of
theoretical issues and applications. These include:
1. Considering other possible sources of bias. This thesis presents several
avenues for bias in social media data. However, there are countless more. For
instance, there are hundreds of different cognitive biases that can manifest in
social media data, as discussed in the related work chapter.These biases all have
the potential to wreak havoc on analyses performed on social data. Future work
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is to assess the extent to which these biases skew social data. If they do, then
other areas of future work will be to develop techniques to reduce their effect.
2. Extending the understanding shill behavior. Our study of shills shined
light on how they behave. We were able to learn important patterns of how they
carry out their attacks online. Unfortunately, our study was limited in two critical
ways. First, we did not have a dataset of adequate size to make meaningful
claims about specific patterns, including temporal or language patterns. A larger
dataset would be needed to make credible claims about their behavior pertaining
to language. Second, we only studied one specific instance of shill behavior
online: the use of shills by Hillary Clinton’s campaign in the 2016 election. More
work will be needed to verify these patterns in other shill campaigns. Finally,
we used off-the-shelf classification techniques
These areas address the sources of social data bias that we discuss in this work. To
conclude the future work discussion, we echo a sentiment that was introduced in the
introduction. There are many areas of social data bias that are ripe for future work.
For example, there are ethical biases and behavioral biases such as those discussed
in Olteanu et al. 2016. In addition to these, we point out that we have provided a
preliminary framework to deal with the biases that we solve in this dissertation. This
framework is intended to be employed by future work. This dissertation serves as a
platform to illuminate the way for researchers to obtain more credible, reproducible
results using this novel source of data, social media. This framework can both be
extended to further explore the biases presented here, and it can also be applied to
new types of bias.
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